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Abstract 
 
This work intends to propose a new form to finance social security expenses using VAT 
in order to decrease the compliance and administrative costs of paying taxes, to increase 
the sustainability of social security systems reducing his dependence on labour taxes, to 
decrease formal economy and to create an individual social account, that is financed by a 
direct tax on the personal labour income and through the declared consumption and 
saving. The social account aims to finance hardships like unemployment, sickness and 
old-age. This proposal involves the maintenance of the actual labour costs but the 
elimination of personal income taxes and taxing individuals when they consume and 
save, stimulating the declaration of individual income by returning a part of the tax 
through a credit on the individual social account, which could reduce informal economy 
and increase the sustainability of social expenses. 
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1 Introduction 
 
According to United Nations (2013) in 2060 for each 100 persons between 15 and 64 
years old, there will exist 28 that have more than 65 years old (from 8.5 in 1950, but 
if we look to Europe that number increases to 50, in Japan it reaches 73, the world 
population is ageing (for 2010 the numbers were 11.6, 23.8 and 35.1, for the World, 
Europe and Japan respectively). On top of that total fertility rates in OECD countries 
have declined dramatically over the past few decades, falling on average from 2.7 in 
1970 to 1.7 children per woman of childbearing age in the 2000s. The total fertility 
rate is below its replacement level of 2.1 in most OECD countries (OECD (2014a)).   
Ageing population and reduction of fertility rate are the main reasons for the 
expected increase on spending of the current social security systems, of which the 
majority have a pay-as-go system (PAYG) (OECD (2013a)). This means that benefits 
paid to retirees are contributed by workers paying into the system. The consequences 
of an increasing dependency ratio (less people contributing to current PAYG systems 
and more people receiving benefits) put pressure on public accounts.  
Countries could counter this if they (i) have healthier public finances or if (ii) people 
were saving enough for retirement or if (iii) social security systems were sustainable. 
Regarding the first option, if public finances generated surplus to face the expected 
increasing spending for social security systems, this problem could be mitigated but 
public finances for OECD and EU countries are not helping to counter the pressure 
from the public expenditure on cash benefits for old-age. The net debt interest 
payments will represent 1.8% and 2.1% of the GDP in all OECD and EU countries in 
2016, respectively
1
. Public net debt is expected to reach 72% of the GDP in all 
OECD and EU countries in 2016 while in 2014 those values were of 71% and 68%
2
, 
respectively. 
Other option to mitigate the pressure from public expenditure on cash benefits for 
old-age and a survivor increase would be personal saving, but it seems we are not 
saving enough. Household saving rates are on average for the Euro Area of 7%
3
, 
while Antolin (2009) says that people need to put aside 15% of their wages during 
their working life to achieve an adequate level of retirement income (assuming a 
target replacement rate of 70%, 40 years of working life and a return of 6%.With the 
same assumptions but with a 5% level of saving we reach a 25.3% replacement rate). 
                                                          
1
 Data obtained through the OECD website, address 
http://www.oecd.org/eco/outlook/economicoutlookannextables.htm 
2
 Id.,at 1 
3
 Id.,at 1 
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Saving is also difficult for most of us, because it requires self-control (Choi et al. 
(2004)) demonstrate how we general lack self-control) and procrastination should be 
avoided (e.g. O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999) shown we usually procrastinate). There 
is considerable evidence that people display time-inconsistent behavior, specifically, 
weighting current and near term consumption especially heavily
4
, which could lead 
us to under save for retirement. 
The last option is having a more sustainable social security system, but it seems that 
is also not happening. Between 1990 and 2009 the public expenditure on cash 
benefits for old-age and a survivor increased 27%, reaching on average 7.8% of the 
GDP and 16.6% of the government spending in OECD countries and is expected to 
reach 11.7% of GDP in 2050 (OECD (2014c)), where the main driver of this increase 
is the dependency ratio. In terms of future responsibilities, according to Mink (2008) 
the estimated implicit pension obligation, yields a burden for the euro area of 174% 
of GDP in 2005.   
OECD countries have being facing the same problem, how to ensure that pension 
systems are financially sustainable and how to give citizens an adequate income in 
retirement, while ensuring that the costs of pension provision do not become too high 
for the next generations in the context of population ageing?  
At present most countries finance mainly their social expenses (programs that insure 
individual’s and their relatives against interruption or loss of earnings power and for 
certain expenses) through taxes on labor (OECD (2013a)), including both payroll 
taxes that finance contributory social security regimes and other taxes on wages and 
labour income that finance a broader array of social programs.  
The tax wedge on labor
5
 in 2013 was on average 35.9%. But countries also finance 
these expenditures through general taxation, using for example the VAT
6
 (Value 
Added Tax), despite the raising contribution from private pension funds and other 
financial sources, like housing (e.g. equity release schemes) (OECD (2013a)). We 
need also to take into account the effect the of tax burden on labor on the level of 
employment, Blumkin et al. (2012) present evidence that subjects reduce less reduce 
their labor supply when a consumption is introduced compared to an equivalent 
direct tax. 
A key question is whether it should continue to be financed primarily or exclusively 
through taxes on labor, or whether efficiency would be enhanced by shifting reliance 
                                                          
4
 To see how this is consistent with how our brain works, see McClure, Laibson et al. (2004) 
5
 Picos-Sánchez (2011) analyzed the effect of indirect taxes on tax wedge of households compared with 
OECD (2014b) 
6
 To see how the VAT works and to have a historical view see chapter 1 in OECD (2014d) 
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to general revenues of government and potentially to other tax bases, of which the 
VAT is the most obvious candidate, as one of the potential fiscal revenue 
enhancements. VAT seems to have space for improve its efficiency, using VAT 
Revenue Ratio (VRR), Barbone et al. (2013) estimated an average VRR Gap for the 
EU-27 (from 2000 until 2011) of 47% and a the interpretation of these results is that 
an important amount of revenue loss during the period 2000-2011 stemmed (in most 
countries) from choices made over time that have introduced and sometimes 
extended multiple rates and exemptions.  
In order to Levy (2010) and others (e.g. Keen (2008)) have argued that current SSC 
(Social Security Contributions) in payroll tax systems, together with non-contributory 
benefit programs available to workers in the informal sector, constitute a subsidy to 
the informal sector which suppresses development of the formal sector and results in 
productivity losses. To remove this bias, Levy (2010) has proposed financing SSC 
from the VAT instead of through contributory payroll taxes. Thomas and Picos-
Sánchez (2012) that point out the need to careful calibrate this change. Shifting part 
of the funding of social expenditure from SSC to consumption taxes has been 
proposed in a number of countries and was implemented in Germany in 2007 (where 
a 1.15 percentage point reduction in both employee and employer unemployment 
insurance rates was fully funded by an increase in the standard VAT rate), and in 
Hungary in 2009 (where a five percentage point reduction in the employer SSC rate 
was fully funded by an increase in the standard VAT rate).  
Other source of potential fiscal revenue enhancement is the reduction of the shadow 
economy, its size in Europe reached a 10 year low in 2013 and is estimated to 
represent 18.5% of economic activity across Europe, reaching a value of €2.15 
trillion
7
(Schneider (2013)).To see the its importance for public accounts, in Portugal, 
Afonso (2014) estimated that informal economy reached a value of 26,81% in 2012, 
if this value was 0% and using a 20% overall tax burden the fiscal deficit would be 
for 2012 of 0.85% instead of 6.43%. 
The above proposals raise an old discussion
8
, should we finance public expenses 
through direct or indirect taxation or should we use a mix of booth.  
As we have seen, the population is ageing, the total fertility rate is below its 
replacement level of 2.1 in most OECD countries, they are facing financial 
constraints due to the increase of pension spending and future responsibilities 
                                                          
7
 Edgar L. Feige (2007) and Frank A. Cowell (1981)  provides an excellent window into the research about 
evasion .To check the efforts made from OECD countries to counteract evasion see  OECD (2013b). 
8
 Since Hobbes (1651) and continuing with Mill (1871), the question of whether to tax consumption or 
income arises repeatedly in tax policy debate. 
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(besides the weight of interest), and one of the major goals of OECD countries is to 
tackle these problems, our proposal don’t intend to be a panacea for all of them, but 
to constitute one more solution, next we present an general overview of it. 
1.1 Our proposal 
 
Our proposal consists on financing the social expenses through a consumption tax 
and from an employee contribution, while maintaining the same level of nominal 
labor costs and eliminating the personal income tax, in our best knowledge it cannot 
be found in the present literature. Basically in this system we only pay direct taxes 
and part of them finances an individual social security account. 
 
Our goal is to present a model that will try to answer to following questions: 
a) It is possible to eliminate income taxes and maintain the same level of tax 
revenue?  
b) It is possible to eliminate or reduce the “underground” economy? 
c) It possible to have an individual social security account that provides an 
adequate income when necessary? 
 
We will try to achieve the answer to previous questions using data from INE 
(Instituto Nacional de Estatistica), in order to obtain data from available income and 
household consumption. Then we will simulate our model using the previous data for 
the Portuguese case, but our proposal can be applied to any country and check if the 
results give a positive or negative answer to our questions. 
 
1.2 Structure 
 
In here we will present our proposed structure, so besides this section; this report is 
going to be structured as follows: in Section 2, a literature review of the topic is 
made. In section 2.1, are presented and the main papers about the financing social 
expenditures trough indirect taxation and also the discussion about indirect and direct 
taxation, in section 2.2, we will present a summary of all the relevant literature.  
In section 3 we present an overview of taxation. In section 3.1 we will present an 
historical evolution of tax ratios, in section 3.2, we will analyze the tax structure in 
the majority of the countries, addressing taxes on income and profits, social security 
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contributions, property taxes and consumption taxes. In section 3.3 we will address 
the differences, pros and cons between direct and indirect taxation. 
In section 4 we will analyze the different social security systems around the world, in 
section 4.1 we will address the design of pension systems and in section 4.2 we 
address the current situation of Social Security Systems in OECD, in section 4.3 will 
post some of the recent developments in social security systems according to the 
OECD publication, Pensions at a Glance. In section 4.4 we will analyze contingent 
liabilities in pension systems and some suggestions for the transition from an 
unfunded to a funded pension system. 
In section 5 will present our proposal in a more complete form, using the referred 
literature. In section 5.1 we will address the transition between the current system and 
our proposal. In section 5.2 we will put to test our theory using official from Portugal 
and using some scenarios for different levels of informal economy. 
     In section 6 will present the conclusions from this paper. 
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2 Literature Review 
 
The value added tax (VAT) has displace many different trade sales, and 
manufacturing taxes in the past half century, becoming a major source of government 
revenue for an increasing number of countries. The tax has all the desirable non-
distortionary theoretical properties of a sales tax, its incidence ultimately falling on 
consumers, but it is much harder to avoid, as the tax is collected most of the time in 
intermediate steps during the production of a finished retail good rather than at the 
final sale. As a result, it has proven incredibly popular as it can collect a great deal of 
revenue (Toder and Rosenberg (2010) and Keen and Lockwood (2010)).  
According to OECD (2014e) VAT become the largest source of taxes from general 
consumption, accounting on average for 6.6% of GDP and 19.5% of total revenue in 
OECD countries in 2012. While this tax is theoretically less distorting than other 
taxes for each monetary unit of revenue collected, there is limited analysis regarding 
its overall impact on the economy, Ufier (2014) analyzed the effects of VAT in 192 
countries in over two decades and he found that VAT adoption is associated with an 
increase in growth and investment as well as lower inflation and government 
spending as a share of GDP, Ormaechea and Yoo (2012) considered a sample of 69 
countries using observations from 1970 until 2009, found among income taxes, social 
security contributions and personal income taxes have a stronger negative association 
with growth than corporate income taxes, a shift from income taxes to property taxes 
has a strong positive association with growth, and a reduction in income taxes while 
increasing value added (VAT) and sales taxes is also associated with faster growth.  
 
But VAT has its costs Barbone et al. (2012) presents a review on literature on the 
costs of VAT and they identified the following drivers in compliance costs: 
 The complexity of legislation, like the number of ‘lines’ to be drawn  exclusions, 
exemptions, deductions, rate differences, goods/services distinctions, costs 
involved in explaining legislation, making rulings and determinations 
 Procedural requirements, the number of returns, requirements for supplementary 
documentation; treatment of cross-border transactions; and, of course, 
registration. The latter is an especially key factor in VAT because possession of a 
VAT number carries with it the potential to, in effect, write a payment order on 
the Treasury without the Treasury approving it or even being aware of it. 
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 The size and nature of clientele (number of taxpayers; structure of economy and 
of business sector), the importance of B2B (transactions between VAT 
registrants) relative to B2C. 
 The difficulty of verifying ‘self-assessed’ information, which varies with such 
factors as the size of the informal sector; the extent and nature of links between 
formal and informal sectors; ‘border effects’ on information flows; the extent to 
which efforts are made with respect to verification and chasing down suspect 
cases; extent of e-invoicing; and the role played by tax professionals 
(accountants in particular). 
 
Correia (2010) shows that tax on consumption allows for redistributive policies with 
no costs in terms of efficiency, its main conclusion is that the tax burden is more 
evenly distributed under the simplest and most efficient tax code, the flat tax rate on 
consumption, the other conclusion, is there exists a mix between income and 
consumption taxes that can redistribute without imposing efficiency losses
9
. 
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) (AS) extend by Mirrlees (1971) pioneering study on 
optimal income taxation by allowing for several consumption goods. AS 
demonstrate that, with certain restrictions on the underlying preferences, taxing 
consumption becomes redundant and the social optimum is attainable by levying a 
labor tax only. 
Using a real-effort experiment Blumkin et al. (2012) with university students as 
subjects, they found, that a tax on labor subjects, reduce their labor supply by 33% 
on average compared to the no-tax treatment, significantly more than the 15% 
decrease in labor supply when is introduced an equivalent consumption tax. Also 
Riedl and Van Winden (2012) compare experimentally the economic performance of 
a small open economy subject to a wage tax (WT) with one subject to a sales-tax-
cum-labor-subsidy (STLS). In the WT treatment, producers pay a wage tax on each 
unit of labor hired. In the STLS treatment, producers incur a sales tax on products 
sold, but also receive a subsidy for each unit of labor hired. According to most 
economic indicators, the STLS outperforms the WT. To explain their results, the 
authors propose that the upfront burden of a WT and uncertainty about product 
prices render producers reluctant to hire labor.  McCaffery (2008) says that 
consumption taxes has in its favor its administrative advantages compared to an 
income tax (i.e., simplicity of measuring consumption versus labor income and ease 
                                                          
9
 For a more complete view of the theoretical contributions on the direct–indirect tax mix, see Atkinson 
and Stiglitz (1980), also Ahmad and Stern (1984), Boadway and Pestieau (2003), and Auerbach (2006). 
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of collection and enforcement) and the elimination of the inter-temporal distortion of 
consumption allocation caused by the taxation of capital income. Toder and 
Rosenberg (2010) through econometric simulations for the USA case, found 
evidence that the distributional burden of a VAT is roughly proportional at the 
bottom but regressive at the top, substituting a VAT for a proportion of payroll taxes 
would make the US fiscal system slightly more progressive and the VAT is much 
less progressive than a corporate income tax and is also mentions that using different 
taxes could raise the administrative marginal costs in such way that it could not be a 
good option to adopt VAT in US case.  
OECD and KIPF (2014) found using OECD data that VAT, when measured against 
income is regressive, but slightly progressive when measured against expenditure, 
they state that reduced VAT rates could have beneficiated more the rich than the 
poor. Decoster et al. (2010), using EUROMOD and data from 6 countries
10
, also 
concluded that indirect taxes are regressive with respect to disposable income but 
proportional or progressive with respect to total expenditures, but indirect taxes are 
in any case less progressive than other components of the tax system and they are 
less progressive than the systems of social insurance contributions of employees. 
Krusell et al. (1996) using a political-equilibrium theory and the neoclassical growth 
model to compare consumption and income tax systems, state income taxes are not 
necessarily worse in welfare terms, and may even be better, consumption taxes 
induce lower output than income taxes as agents internalize the higher distortionary 
cost induced by income taxes.  
In terms of financing social expenses through indirect taxes Bird and Smart (2012) 
analyzed the substitution of payroll taxes for VAT to finance social expenditures in 
South America where he suggests in countries with large informal sectors it is 
probably best to finance incremental expansions of social programs from broad-based 
taxes like VAT instead of payroll taxes. Levy (2010) like Bird and Smart (2012) 
analyzed the interaction between the formal and informal sector, and they found that 
usually small firms stay out of the formal sector and these are the least efficient firms 
on the economy, which increases the need for social programs for the informal 
workers and so subsidies to this sector paid by the formal sector, hurting the global 
economy by reducing the global welfare. Evaluating the Levy (2010) proposal for 
Mexico where he has proposed financing Social Insurance from the VAT instead of 
                                                          
10
 Belgium, Hungary, Ireland, United Kingdom and Greece 
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through contributory payroll taxes, Antón-Sarabia and Hernández-Trillo (2010) 
found that the VAT revenue/GDP ratio would increase from 3.8% to 6.8%, real 
wages would increase 21% due to the elimination of social contributions, if taking 
into account the tax evasion from firms the revenue/GDP ratio would be nearly 
unchanged. 
For the EU, Ainsworth (2011) comments the experiment in EU to implement in some 
countries a reduced VAT rate in labor intensive sectors in order to increase jobs on 
those sectors, it was found that didn´t happen and a reduction on payroll direct costs 
would have a 52% higher impact on employment than what would occur under a 
general tax cut.  
Thomas and Picos-Sánchez (2012) tested two reforms a reduction in all SSC rates by 
five percent fully funded by an increase in the standard VAT rate; and the same five 
percent reduction in all SSC rates fully funded by increasing reduced VAT rates 
using data from 13 OECD countries
11
, they concluded that those actions would 
increase work incentives for low-income workers at both participation and hours-
worked margins. However these increases will generally be small as part of the VAT 
increase will still be borne by low-income workers. Gadenne (Unpublished Work) 
analyzed for the French case, a decrease in payroll taxes financed by an increase in 
the VAT and she found workers always gain, and capital owners always loose, the 
increase in labor income relative to capital income would be 7.1%. In an opposite 
conclusion, Rebiere (2013) analyzing the French proposal to introduce a social VAT, 
found that in an open economy when the international capital mobility is sufficiently 
high, workers are more inclined to suffer from the reform but in close economy the 
opposite occurs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11
 Finland, France, Hungary, Luxembourg, Poland, Slovak Republic, Spain, UK, Austria, 
Greece, Ireland, Netherlands and Germany. 
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2.1 Summary of relevant literature 
 
Table 5: Summary of relevant literature  
Goal Approach Results Author 
Construct a formal 
model of the effects of 
labour and VAT 
contrasting in particular 
their incidence on 
wages, their 
implications for 
government revenue 
and for equity, and their 
effects on the informal 
economy. 
 
 
 
 
The author used a formal 
model 
 
The analysis highlights a 
number of key factors 
that favor incremental 
financing of social 
insurance through a 
broad-based tax like 
VAT in Latin America 
in place of expansion of 
the payroll tax. 
 
 
Bird and Smart (2012) 
 
 
Effects of imposing a 
new value added tax 
(VAT) in the United 
States and using the 
revenue raised to lower 
payroll tax and 
corporate income tax 
rates 
 
Microsimulation model 
disaggregates 
consumption into 
twenty-two different 
categories,  derived from 
the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics’ Consumer 
Expenditure Survey 
(CEX) and calibrated to 
NIPA aggregates. 
 
Both a VAT and a 
payroll tax are neutral 
between current and 
future consumption and 
do not discourage saving 
and investment. The 
distributional burden of a 
VAT is roughly 
proportional at the 
bottom of the income 
distribution but 
regressive at the top. 
 
 
 
 
Toder and Rosenberg 
(2010) 
 
 
 
A Reduced Rate of 
VAT for Labor 
Intensive Services in 
UE and its effects with 
the purpose of 
stimulating 
Employment 
 
 
 
 
In 1999 the EU began 
experimenting in nine 
Member States 
EU macro-economic 
simulations based on 
these findings also 
suggest that the best way 
to use payroll tax 
incentives to increase 
employment is to use 
them to directly reduce 
the cost of labor. 
Frequently, the VAT 
reduction did not pass-
through to consumers as 
a price reduction 
 
 
 
 
 
Ainsworth (2011) 
Study of the fiscal 
incidence of a fiscal 
reform consisting of a 
reduction in 
employers' social 
insurance contributions 
financed by a tax based 
on the value added in 
France 
 
 
 
The author used a formal 
model 
In an open economy 
when the international 
capital mobility is 
sufficiently high, 
workers are more 
inclined to suffer from 
the reform but in close 
economy the opposite 
occurs 
 
 
 
Rebiere (2013) 
 
 
Test the effects of the 
effects of reducing 
social contributions 
while compensating 
with the increase of 
VAT 
 
 
Using a Microsimulation 
program- EUROMOD, 
for 5 EU countries 
Indirect taxes are 
regressive with respect 
to disposable income but 
proportional 
or progressive with 
respect to total 
expenditures, and 
indirect taxes 
are in any case less 
progressive than other 
components of the tax 
system 
 
 
 
 
Decoster, Loughrey et 
al. (2010) 
  Countries with the least  
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Verify the welfare 
effects of income and 
consumption taxes 
Use a political-
equilibrium theory and 
the neoclassical growth 
model to compare 
consumption and income 
tax systems. 
reliance on consumption 
taxes (CT) are all 
associated with 
relatively small transfer 
systems and high output 
levels; CT induce lower 
output than income taxes 
 
 
Krusell et al. (1996) 
 
 
 
 
Check if income and 
consumption taxes ever 
are really in terms of 
labour supply 
Using economic students 
tested the effects of a 
50% flat wage tax 
imposed on earned 
income and  the 
equivalent 
consumption tax 
treatment, a 100% ad-
valorem tax is levied on 
both consumption goods 
 
 
Subjects reduce their 
labor supply by1/3 in 
income tax compared to 
the no-tax treatment, 
while in consumption tax 
the decreases only about 
15% of the no-tax 
 
 
 
 
 
Blumkin et al. (2012) 
 
 
Verify the effects of the 
increase of VAT in five 
percent while reducing 
SC contributions in five 
percent 
 
 
 
Uses data from 12 EU 
countries from 2003 to 
2006 
They increase work 
incentives for low-
income workers 
However, these increases 
will generally be small 
as part of the VAT 
increase will still be 
borne by low-income 
workers 
 
 
 
Thomas and Picos-
Sánchez (2012) 
 
 
 
2.2 Critical analysis of the literature reviewed 
 
All the previous studies except Blumkin et al. (2012) and Riedl and Van Winden 
(2012)
12
, assume no behavioral response to changes in tax, the emergence of behavioral 
finance has already shown us the different bias from humans
13
 and if we don´t take them 
into account we can end with wrong conclusions, but is hard to insert a behavior 
response in an model
14
, even though we should try to include those bias in order to reach 
to better assessments and so better answers. We also have different conclusions for the 
same subject (e.g. Ufier (2014) and Krusell et al. (1996)), usually this is due to different 
methodological approaches or samples which don´t allow us to compare the results from 
different author´s, being this one of the major difficulties when addressing literature. 
                                                          
12
 To check the an overview of modern field experiments and their usage in economics see Levitt and List 
(2007, 2009) 
13
 Here is a list from some of our emotional and cognitive bias from behavioral finance literature: 
 Availability-Kahneman (2003) 
 People are highly suggestible-Johnson and Goldstein (2003) 
 Overconfidence-Svenson (1981) 
 Representativeness-Kahneman and Tversky, (1973) 
 Anchoring-Kahneman and Tversky (1974) 
 Self-attribution bias-Hastorf, Schneider and Polefka (1970) 
 Hindsight bias- Fischoff, (1975) 
 Mental accounting bias-Thaler (1985) 
14
 To check the major critics to Behavioral Finance, see Fama (1998) 
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Recently studies from EU
15
 and OECD
16
 state that personal income taxes and social 
security contributions paid by employees affect the decisions of individuals about taking 
paid work and the number of hours they work, hence impacting labor supply and 
corporate taxes are found to be most harmful for growth, followed by personal income 
taxes, and then consumption taxes. But Rebiere (2013) for the French case reached a 
different conclusion, confirming Johansson et al. (2008) assessment: “As institutional 
settings vary significantly across OECD countries, the effect of taxation on long-run 
unemployment is likely to be highly country specific”, which don´t allow an extension to 
more developed countries from the results of Antón-Sarabia and Hernández-Trillo 
(2010), Levy (2010) and Bird and Smart (2012).  
In short the studies, in general, lack behavioral responses and they are from different 
periods, countries or use different methodologies which prevent us to extend the 
analysis, but they leave clues which can allow us to reach better solutions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15
 Check http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/themes/02_taxation.pdf  
16
 See Johansson and et al. (2008) 
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3 Taxation an overview 
 
In this chapter we analyze the historical evolution of taxation ratios, how usually is the 
tax structure in OECD countries and weights of each tax and finally an analysis of direct 
vs indirect taxation in terms of its weights and effects on macro-economic variables, 
with special emphasis in employment. 
3.1 Historical evolution of tax ratios 
 
The level and structures of taxation differ widely across OECD members. The total share 
of taxes on GDP (including social security contributions) varies widely, between a 
minimum below 20% of GDP in Mexico (19.7%) in 2013 and a maximum close to 50% 
in Denmark (48.6%). The historical evolution of tax ratios can be divided in 4 periods: 
 
1. From 1965 to 1975 the tax burden increased 3.8 p.p. (percentage points), until 
the first oil shock (between 1973 and 1974) the strong and almost interrupted 
income growth enabled tax rises in all OECD countries.  
2. From 1975 and 1985 the tax burden increased 3.1 p.p., in middle of the 70´s due 
to slower growth in income levels and higher unemployment levels limited the 
government’s capacity to raise revenue from tax rates rises. But after the second 
oil shock in 1979 in order to finance higher spending in social security and to 
balance budget deficits, countries especially in Europe saw their tax ratios rise 
again. 
3. From 1985 to 1995, the tax burden increased 1.9 p.p., because most countries 
reduced their statutory rates, where the negative impact from tax rates reduction 
was often offset by the elimination of tax reliefs. 
4. From 1995 onward, the tax burden increased 0.1 p.p. so the lowest increase of 
all 4 periods, in fact the growth rate of tax burden as we saw decreased through 
time. In this period we need to look until 2000, where the tax burden reached a 
record of 34.3% then fell slightly until 2004, rising between 2005 until 2007, 
before fell again after the crisis in 2007 to the previous levels. 
3.2 Tax structure 
 Taxes on income and profits 
On average OECD countries collected 34% of their tax revenues through taxes on 
income and profits. The variation in the share of personal income tax between countries 
is considerable, it ranged from 9% in Slovak Republic to 51% in Denmark.  
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In terms of corporate income tax the ratio was on average from 1965 until 2012 of 9%, 
but within the OECD countries the share in total taxes show a considerable spread from 
3% in Greece, Slovenia and Hungary to 25% in Norway. These differences are partly 
explained by instructional factors and the importance of mineral resources in the local 
economy (e.g. oil in Norway). 
 Social security contributions 
 
Again, OECD countries show a wide variety in the share of social security contributions 
in total tax, from Australia and New Zealand, where there aren’t social security 
contributions to Slovak Republic where this value reaches 44%. Where employers pay 
on average 55% of the total amount while the employee pays the remaining. Since 1965 
the employee share increased from 6 p.p. to 10 p.p. in the share of the total tax while for 
the employers this share increased from 10 p.p. to 15 p.p.. 
 Property taxes 
 
The share of property taxes fell from 8% to 5% and in relative terms in four countries 
the property taxes exceed 10% of the total tax revenue, respectively Canada, South 
Korea, UK and USA. 
 Consumption taxes 
 
The total share from these taxes fell from 36% to 31% of the total tax revenue from 1965 
to 2012. But their composition changed a lot since 1965. General consumption taxes 
represent now 20% of the total, while in 1965 was approximately 12%, this change 
shows the growing importance of VAT. This increase served to compensate the 
diminishing share of specific consumption taxes (e.g. taxes on Tabaco), they more than 
halved there total weight from 1965, passing from a weigh of 24% in 1965 to 11% in 
2012. Nevertheless new specific consumption taxes have been created, namely 
environmental related taxes.  
3.3 Direct and indirect taxation 
In 1965 the share of direct taxes was around 61% while in 2012 represented 66%, the 
indirect taxation represented 39% in 1965 while in 2012 reached a level of 34%, but if 
we divide the direct taxation in personal income taxes and social security contributions, 
we see a decrease from 44% in 1965 to 40% in 2012 while social security contributions 
increased from 18% to 26%.The most recent proposals from institutions like IMF and 
OECD tend to suggest a shift from direct to indirect taxation, the reasoning of these 
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proposals are mainly connected to find a way to maintain the actual levels of taxation 
while increasing employment. Their motivation is that by reducing taxation of labor, 
returns to labor income would become more attractive and hence encourage the take-up 
of jobs, particularly at the lower end of the wage distribution (and depending on labour 
supply elasticities). Currently, labor market participation is low in several EU countries 
compared to the US or in Japan. Mobilizing the "missing" labor resources would 
undoubtedly boost GDP significantly. Also VAT seems to have space for improve its 
efficiency, using VAT Revenue Ratio (VRR)
17
 that is the measure which is commonly 
used for assessing VAT performance, and basically is defined as the ratio of actual VAT 
revenue to the revenue that would be raised if VAT were levied at the standard rate on 
all consumption with perfect enforcement
18
. Barbone et al. (2013) estimated an average 
VRR Gap for the EU-27 (from 2000 until 2011) of 47%. 
In 2014 the tax wedge was on average 36%, with Belgium with a value of 55.6% and 
Chile with 7%, where the Social Security contributions represent the main share of this 
value, ranging from 83% in Poland and 0 in New Zealand. The negative impact on 
employment of employees' social contributions can be less than that of taxes, if the rate 
of return of pension’s contributions is not too far from the rate of return on individual 
savings. 
Cutting personal income taxes would not directly reduce enterprises' production costs, 
unless enterprises were able to cut salaries by the same amount. If there is an offsetting 
increase of taxation of goods, this however seems unlikely, owing to the long run 
                                                          
17
 VAT revenue ratio (VRR), which represents the “ideal” revenue that could be generated by a VAT 
system applied to consumption as measured in National Accounts, without exemptions or reduced/zero 
rates and with perfect enforcement (or zero VAT Gap). The VRR gap is a summary measure of the 
shortfall in VAT revenue collections, compared to a benchmark of uniform taxation of all consumption, 
and full compliance by taxpayers. More specifically, the definition of the VAT Revenue Ratio gap: VRR 
Gap = 1 – (Actual Revenue) / (Notional Ideal Revenue), where the Notional Ideal Revenue is defined as 
the standard rate of VAT times the aggregate consumption of the household, non-profit, and government 
sectors, as recorded in the national accounts. 
18
 The VRR measure is not without some problems. For example, it assumes that moving to the 
benchmark tax would not affect either the level or composition of consumption, which is unlikely (Alm 
and El-Ganainy 2013). In addition, it assumes that “consumption” as defined in the national accounts is 
the same as the aggregate tax base that would be subject to such an ideal uniform comprehensive VAT. As 
OECD (2014b) shows, however, in principle a number of adjustments to national accounts data are needed 
to estimate something closer to the real base of the VAT because final consumption as reported in the 
accounts includes some items that are not subject to VAT and excludes some items that are subject to 
VAT. Finally, even if the national accounts base is simply accepted, several different versions of the c-
efficiency ratio may be calculated depending on the precise nature of the consumption base chosen: for 
example, Alm and El Ganainy (2013) use final household consumption expenditure (as do Borselli et al. 
(2012)), while the present report, like Keen (2013), uses a broader conception of final consumption that 
also includes such consumption not only by households but also by the government and non-profit sectors. 
In practice, final consumption is measured in expenditure terms and includes not only private final 
consumption expenditures by households but also final consumption expenditures by non-profit 
organizations serving households as well as by general government. All are at the end of the supply chain 
and in principle should therefore pay VAT on their inputs. However, because the output of government 
and non-profit sectors is usually not subject to output VAT, they cannot deduct such input VAT which 
thus becomes part of their costs as well as part of potential VAT revenues. For a complete discussion 
about VRR see Barbone et al. (2013). 
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behavior of labor supply. Specifically, if VAT is increased by the same amount as 
personal income taxes are cut, the price of goods would increase so that for many 
salaried workers the real, as opposed to the nominal, wage rate might not increase. The 
supply of labour is usually thought to depend on the real wage rate; if the latter does not 
increase, the former should not increase either. In other words, if my take-home pay 
increases by 20%, but the price of all goods goes up by the same percentage, there is no 
compelling reason why I should modify my behavior and work longer hours, as we are 
going to see more ahead other author´s show different results. 
Two often-raised arguments in favor of a shift to a consumption tax are its 
administrative advantages compared to an income tax (i.e., simplicity of measuring 
consumption versus labor income and ease of collection and enforcement) and the 
elimination of the inter-temporal distortion of consumption allocation caused by the 
taxation of capital income (see McCaffery (2002)). 
Jackman et al. (1996)  argue labour supply (and therefore wages) depends on the total 
tax burden of a worker household, if VAT is de facto largely paid by workers there is 
little scope for a positive labor market reaction from the shift. Hence the issue is not 
straightforward; it is necessary to evaluate carefully, in a general equilibrium model, 
how the rebalancing in taxation would affect labor supply, before we can judge the 
effects on output. Supply (and therefore wages) depends on the total tax burden of a 
worker household, if VAT is de facto largely paid by workers there is little scope for a 
positive labor market reaction from the shift. Hence the issue is not straightforward; it is 
necessary to evaluate carefully, in a general equilibrium model, how the rebalancing in 
taxation would affect labor supply, before we can judge the effects on output. 
The specific features of the labour market institutions also play an important role in 
determining the effectiveness of the envisaged shift. Factors such as the centralized vis-
à-vis decentralized nature of wage bargaining, union power, the precise characteristics of 
the unemployment benefits (e.g., even the question whether benefits are taxed or 
untaxed) and the existence, level and coverage of minimum wages are likely to exert an 
important influence on the existence of real wage resistance and hence the outcome, 
particularly in the short-term. This implies that any shift would be likely to have 
different effects across countries. 
But in a real experiment Blumkin et al. (2012) tested the effect from direct and indirect 
taxation in labour supply and they found evidence that post-paid consumption taxes 
encourage higher labor supply than equivalent pre-paid wage taxes. Their hypothesis is 
based on money illusion, that is, individuals' observed tendency to think in nominal 
rather than real terms. An individual suffering from money illusion will typically display 
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a reluctance to accept a nominal wage cut or to sell a house at a nominal loss. Likewise, 
is anticipated that individuals to respond more adversely to a nominal wage cut (due to a 
wage tax) than to a reduction in the real wage rate (due to a consumption tax). And their 
results corroborate the money illusion explanation, because individuals affected by 
direct taxation reduced their labour supply by 1/3 on average compared to the no-tax 
treatment, significantly more than the 15% decrease in labor supply in individuals 
affected by indirect taxation. 
So it’s not consensual the opinion of several authors regarding the effects from the 
change from direct taxation to indirect taxation, in a study from OECD (OECD (2006)), 
they show results from growth regressions cautiously supporting the hypothesis that 
countries with a higher share of indirect taxation have tended to grow faster in the last 
decades, but for example Poterba (1996), where is studied the effect from the changes in 
the mix of direct and indirect taxation, conclude that in the majority of the countries 
from their sample a revenue-neutral switch from direct to indirect taxes has no impact on 
the level of long term economic activity. Another important argument against the change 
from direct to indirect taxation is the impact on income distribution, Duncan and Peter 
(2008) found that progressivity reduces inequality in reported gross and net income, but 
as a much smaller impact on inequality when is approximated by consumption-based 
measures of Gini. 
In terms of long term effects, literature is also inconclusive, Piketty et al. (2011) look at 
evidence from 18 OECD countries on tax rates and economic growth for the 1960-2010 
time period. The authors find no evidence of a correlation between growth in real GDP 
per capita and the drop in the top marginal rate for the 1960-2010. Mendoza et al. (1997) 
and Garrison and Lee (1992) find no tax effects on growth in developed countries. 
Padovano and Galli (2001) find that a 10 percentage point reduction in marginal tax 
rates raises the growth rate by 0.11 percentage points in OECD countries. Engen and 
Skinner (1992) find significant effects of taxes on growth in a sample of 107 countries, 
but the tax effects are small and insignificant when estimated only on developed 
countries. 
From literature we can’t say what is the best system or what is the correct mix from 
direct and indirect taxation, because the results are so diverse, but in order to increase 
the number of opinions, in this paper we will propose a new form of taxation that in our 
opinion will affect the level of savings for retirement and also the total amount collected 
by governments. 
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4 Social security systems around the world 
 
In this chapter we analyze the design of current pension systems, the current situation, 
the recent developments in OECD countries and finally the contingent liabilities due to 
reliance of most countries in unfunded pension systems, which is important in this study 
because we recommend a transfer to funded system. 
4.1 Design of Pension Systems 
 
According to Turner (1998) the structure of retirement income systems can be 
characterized as a four tier system. 
1. The first tier is a government-provided anti-poverty benefit. It provides a social 
safety net. It includes means tested and income tested benefits for low income 
elderly and flat benefits that are received based on years of residence. This tier is 
usually financed out of general government revenue. 
2. The second tier is a mandatory unfunded defined benefit scheme or notional 
defined contribution scheme provided through the government social security 
system. This tier is the traditional pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security system 
found in most countries. It provides social insurance for workers against some 
economic risks by spreading the effects of risks across the population. 
3. The third tier is funded benefits. These could be provided by the government or 
by private sector entities. This tier could be combined with the second tier as a 
single partially funded plan. This tier could be mandatory or voluntary. When it 
is voluntary, the fourth tier can be distinguished from it as being composed of 
non-pension arrangements. While generally it is important have a funded source 
of retirement income, it is not essential in all countries that the source be 
mandatory. 
4. The fourth tier is voluntary and supplementary. It includes private savings, 
voluntary occupational pension schemes, voluntary individual pension accounts, 
labour earnings, support from family members, and charity. In some countries, 
savings in the form of housing is an important aspect of retirement savings in the 
fourth tier. Housing can be used both as an investment that is liquidated in 
retirement and as a source of services that are paid for before retirement. 
 
 
 
  
 
19 
 
4.2 Current situation of Social Security Systems 
 
Population ageing and reduction of fertility rate had increase the dependency ratio, there 
is no consensus among demographers on trends over the very long term, e.g. whether 
there is a natural biological limit to longevity, the impact of future medical 
breakthroughs, long-term impact of public health programmers and societal behavior 
such as reduction of smoking rates or increased prevalence of obesity. Past population 
projections from official sources have, however, generally underestimated the gains in 
life expectancy at birth as it was difficult to imagine that the reduction of mortality 
would continue at the same pace in the long run. Some commentators have argued that 
as a consequence, governments may have underestimated the potential budgetary impact 
of ageing populations (Commission and Committee (2014)), this risk is known as 
longevity risk (unexpected increases in life spans) (United Nations (2013)). Also total 
fertility rates in OECD countries have declined dramatically over the past few decades, 
falling on average from 2.7 in 1970 to 1.7 children per woman of childbearing age in the 
2000s. In all OECD countries, fertility rates declined for young women and increased at 
older ages
19
.  
Most of the social security systems have a pay-as-go system (PAYG) (OECD 
(2013a)),where benefits paid to retirees are contributed by workers paying into the 
system currently. This means that in many countries, pension expenses will tend to rise. 
Recent reforms have aimed at maintaining or restoring financial sustainability of pension 
systems by reducing future pension spending (OECD (2013a)). In order to improve the 
sustainability of pension systems, governments typically use the following three 
measures i) increases in the statutory retirement age; ii) improved provision of financial 
incentives to work beyond retirement age, e.g. through work bonuses and increases in 
pension benefit at retirement; and iii) less or no early retirement schemes. Retirement 
ages will be at least 67 years by around 2050 in most OECD countries (OECD (2013a)), 
despite some author´s argue against it (e.g. Fanti (2014)). 
The tax wedge on labor
20
 in 2013 was on average 35.9% (Belgium with 55.8% and Chile 
with 7% are the extremes) in OECD countries, where 13.1% refers to income tax, 8.26% 
to the social security contributions from the employee and 14.29% to employer social 
security contributions (OECD (2014d)). 
Between 1990 and 2009 the public expenditure on cash benefits for old-age and a 
survivor increased 27%, reaching on average 7.8% of the GDP and 16.6% of the 
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 In order to see some possible causes see Mace, R. (2014), Buhr and Huinink (2014), Berrington and 
Pattaro (2014) and D'Addio and d'Ercole (2005) 
20
 Picos-Sánchez (2011) analyzed the effect of indirect taxes on tax wedge of households compared with 
OECD (2014b) 
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government spending in OECD countries and is expected to reach 11.7% of GDP in 
2050 (OECD (2014c)), where the main driver of this increase is the dependency ratio. 
In terms of future responsibilities, according to Mink (2008) the estimated implicit 
pension obligation, using a discount rate of 5%, yields a burden for the euro area of 
174% of GDP in 2005. A lower discount rate of 3% increases this figure even further, to 
217% of GDP, in 2050 it expected to reach 193% and 243% of the GDP for a discount 
rate of 5% and 3% respectively, despite the difficulties to calculate the above values
21
.  
Pension reforms made during the past decades reduced the promise for workers who 
enter in labour market, working longer could atone these reductions, but the future don’t 
for future retirees don’t seem bright. 
4.3 Recent developments on Social Security Systems  
 
Below we try to sum up by the conclusions and recent developments according to the 
OECD publication Pensions at a Glance (OECD (2013a)). 
We need to save more and work longer, increasing the normal pension age has been the 
most common reform during the past five years. As a consequence, the majority of 
OECD countries will have a retirement age of at least 67 years by the middle of this 
century. A few countries are going beyond this age by linking increases of the pension 
age directly to the evolution of life expectancy. Large structural reforms leading to a 
complete overhaul of the pension system have been rare in recent years. But several 
countries introduced or have decided on the future introduction of a defined-contribution 
pension scheme, for example the Czech Republic, Israel and the United Kingdom. At the 
same time, two countries (Poland and Hungary) reduced or closed their privately-
managed funded defined-contribution schemes. 
Poor currently protected but everyone will get less in future, while pensioners were 
largely protected in the initial phases of the financial and economic crisis and sometimes 
even benefited from discretionary increases in pensions as part of economic stimulus 
programmes, retirees are now also being affected by expenditure cuts in the context of 
fiscal consolidation. For example pension benefits have not been increased since 2009 in 
Ireland, but retirees were still relatively less affected by declines in income than the 
working-age population. In Portugal, pension benefit levels were frozen in 2011, and the 
13
th 
and 14
th
 monthly payments were abolished for higher-paid pensioners
22
. Workers 
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 For more information about the difficulties to calculate the estimated implicit pension obligation see 
Holzmann et al. (2004) and Yermo (2007). 
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 In 2014 this measure was reversed due to a decision from the Portuguese Constitutional Court, being 
partially compensated by recalibrating the exceptional contribution already in place for pensions above 
1350 € (CES-Contribuição Extraordinária de Solidariedade), for more check 
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who enter the labour market today will be promised lower pension benefits than 
previous generations due to the series of reforms OECD countries implemented over the 
last 20 years. Working longer may compensate for some of these reductions but in 
general every year that workers contribute toward their future pension is credited with 
lower benefits in defined-benefit schemes than before the reforms. In Korea, for 
example, the target replacement rate for pensions is falling from 50% to 40% for 
workers who have contributed during 40 years. In Austria, the pension entitlement 
accrual rate is being reduced from 2% per year of contributions to 1.78% over time. 
Accruals at various earnings thresholds have also been reduced in the Czech Republic 
and the United Kingdom. 
More workers need to be covered in emerging economies, for the non-OECD countries 
recent reforms have concentrated primarily on increasing the level of coverage, which is 
currently much lower than that of OECD countries. For example, China introduced a 
new rural pension in 2009 to provide social assistance to rural residents as they are not 
covered by the urban pension. This was extended nationally to include non-salaried 
urban residents from 2012, after regional trials in 2011. In May 2009 the Indian 
government permitted voluntary participation for all private-sector workers in the New 
Pension System as previously only state employees was covered. This scheme is 
currently being expanded to include the 300 million workers in the unorganized sector 
by partially matching contributions and investing heavily in public awareness 
campaigns. 
Pension promise will decrease, future benefits are set to decline across all of the 
earnings distribution, but the patterns differ markedly between countries. In most cases, 
countries did aim to protect the lowest earners from benefit cuts. In Mexico, full 
protection was given to the poorest 30% of all workers who will be eligible for the 
minimum pension, provided that they have made the necessary contributions during their 
working lives. In Greece and Portugal, the reduction of pension benefits is considerably 
lower for those in the bottom quarter of the earnings distribution. Sweden is a particular 
case in this respect: lower earners were protected compared to average earners, but the 
reforms actually benefit the richest 20% of workers most while the largest reductions are 
borne by those between the 40th and 70th percentiles. In all other countries apart from 
Sweden the highest earners will be most affected by the reforms. In Greece, for example, 
future pensions for the richest 10% of workers will be only half of what they would have 
been if no reforms had taken place.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
http://www.portugal.gov.pt/en/the-ministries/minister-of-the-presidency-and-of-parliamentary-
affairs/keep-updated/20140102-cm-paef.aspx 
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Early retirement access is being tightened, this means that the issue of early retirement 
has not been covered. But it should be noted that many countries have also tightened or 
discouraged access to early retirement schemes. For example in Greece the early 
retirement age has gone from 53 to 60 years, while in Portugal access to early retirement 
was suspended until at least 2014. But it is unlikely that all workers will be in a position, 
for health or other reasons, to actually work fully up until the sometimes substantially 
higher retirement ages; countries will need to monitor this situation, ensure that working 
conditions are such that working longer is a possibility and provide targeted support both 
to keep workers with health problems or physically demanding occupations in the labour 
force and to provide benefits to those who cannot work. In some countries there is also a 
policy debate around the career length needed to reach full, unreduced benefits and 
whether it is fair to expect people who started to work at young ages in work until 67 or 
beyond. 
Pension adequacy issues remain, as population ageing progresses expenditures will rise 
but the recent reforms will likely at least stabilize, if not reduce, future pension 
spending. At the same time, policy concerns around adequacy are likely to increase in 
some countries. Countries with traditionally limited public pension systems, such as 
New Zealand and the United Kingdom, are addressing adequacy concerns by promoting 
individual pension provision through auto-enrolment schemes. In Australia, 
contributions to mandatory funded pensions have been increased for the same reason 
while Germany has chosen to offer tax credits to people taking up voluntary private 
pensions. The distributional implications of a stronger reliance on private defined-
contribution pension schemes will need to be monitored carefully as lower-income 
workers will find it harder to contribute sufficient amount over long periods to such 
schemes. 
Public services are retirement income enhancers. This is especially true of healthcare 
and long term care services. Services benefit the poorest retirees much more than they 
do richer elderly households. Public support is set to play an increasingly important role 
in preventing old age poverty among people requiring health and long term care service. 
Regulations that allow individuals greater choice over the way their retirement savings 
are invested in private plans. Canada, Estonia, Hungary, Israel, Mexico and Poland, for 
example, have adopted this policy, supported by measures to move people automatically 
into less risky investments as they get closer to retirement. 
Several countries are trying to increase their administrative efficiency, for example 
Australia introduced a simple, low-cost new scheme – My Super – in July 2013 with the 
aim of providing a default superannuation product with a standard set of features for 
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comparability. Similarly, the Chilean government has been fostering competition among 
plan managers to courage the emergence of affordable, cost-efficient schemes. In 
Sweden a new low-cost fund, AP7, has been competing with expensive investment 
options since 2010. In the same vein, Japan setup a new authority in 2010 to run public 
schemes at a lower cost, while centralized private pension management is a policy 
objective in Mexico and the United Kingdom. Denmark, Greece, Italy and Sweden have 
merged the different authorities in charge of managing and paying social security 
benefits. In Greece, for example, the number of plans had dropped from 133 to just three 
by the end of 2010. 
4.4 Contingent liabilities in pension systems, unfunded vs funded liabilities. 
 
The reform of public pension systems has become a key policy issue in many countries. 
Because conventional approaches to reform largely unfunded retirement income 
schemes prove politically and economically difficult, attention has focused on the option 
of a partial shift towards funded provisions. Yet this too presents problems. The 
liabilities to the current generation of retirees and workers under an unfunded pension 
scheme constitute a huge, hidden public debt. Most countries find that making this 
implicit debt fully explicit, repaying it and thus reversing the initial redistribution 
towards the start-up generation, lie beyond their political, economic and fiscal capacities. 
As we saw earlier the population ageing due to low fertility rates and rising life 
expectancy, further system maturation in many countries, the result of past policy 
decisions on coverage and benefit levels,  the likely adverse labour market implications 
of high contribution rates and insufficient links between contributions and benefits, and 
the negative effects on private and national saving, arising possibly from the unfunded 
character of the schemes and certainly from the impact on public saving of the fiscal 
imbalances that they generate.  
Pension liabilities are the present value of the difference between projected contributions 
and expenditures of the social security pension system. Eichhorst (2010) present some 
values of the implicit pension debt and also shows that the methodology used in order to 
calculate it is an important aspect to take into account, because using one method we can 
achieve 357% of the GDP for Italy, while in other method we can see ´only` 157% for 
the same country. Even though this paper shows that the implicit debt can go from 68% 
for the UK to 185% for Greece of their GDP, this taking into account the methodology 
with the lowest values. In a very recent study for Portugal the GEP/MSESS (2015) 
evaluated also the implicit pension liability, assuming a 5% discount rate we see a the 
implicit debt reaches 84%, while using a 3% discount rate the value reaches 180% of 
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2013 GDP what adding to the present explicit 138,1%
23
 we can reach 318%.This public 
debt is not included in the official numbers, what in our opinion can mislead the general 
public, but it seems that is not ignored by financial markets, using the premium for 
sovereign risk derived from derived from the credit default swap (CDS) market, the 
explicit government debt position (explicit and implicit debt positions) according to 
Ponds et al. (2011), is highly correlated reaching values from 0.58 to 0.78. 
The previous numbers represent a very high bill to future generations to pay, Holzmann 
(1997) taking this into account presents the potential benefits from moving from 
unfunded to funded systems, below a brief list of those benefits: 
 The approach can break deadlock in traditional reform attempts because it 
implies a time consistent and hence credible reform (Holzmann (1994)), by 
stressing the economic advantages and the positive impact on economic growth, 
it opens arguments that all can win, thus abandoning intractable zero-sum games 
and shifting the discussion from distributional concerns to efficiency and growth 
issues. It provides transparency by explicitly distinguishing between the saving-
insurance functions of a pension system (individual accounts and individual 
equity) from those of redistribution and social protection, and reduces the scope 
for future opportunistic behavior by politicians. 
 It isolates retirement provisions from political interference and risk (Godoy and 
Valdes-Prieto (1997)). 
 It heightens workers’ concern for financial issues and enterprise performance, 
reducing the dichotomy of interests between capital and labour (Piñera (1991)). 
 This reform establishes a close link between contributions and benefits, thus 
reducing the labour market distortions of traditional, unfunded programs (Pordes 
(1994)). 
 The reform furthers and accelerates financial market development and thus 
efficiency of resource allocation (Davis (1998), Holzmann (1996)). 
 The reform positively affects national saving and capital accumulation (IMF 
(1995)). 
The main problems of this transition are the promised benefits to the actual and future 
pensioners, as we saw previously for Portugal for example they could represent 180% of 
2013 GDP. Holzmann (1997) proposes some strategies for this transition, some were and 
are being implemented by some countries as we saw earlier, regardless of that we are 
going to expose them because in overall they are pertinent and relevant or our study. 
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 Strategy 1: would reduce the Social Security Debt (SSD) by curtailing future 
commitments, through an increase in the retirement age, a decrease in the annual 
accrual factor or a change in the indexation procedure (say, from wage to price 
indexation). 
 Strategy 2: involves a partial shift towards a funded system, thus making only 
part of the SSD explicit. 
 Strategy 3: applies an expenditure-minimizing procedure to determine the 
compensation to individuals willing to switch to the funded scheme and forego 
the benefits of the unfunded on. Setting the switching age exogenously (say, all 
below age 40) either does not conform with individual preferences and thus 
undermines support for the reform or does conform but is at least as expensive as 
the individual voluntary decision. There are two extreme options: under the 
radical option, all commitments — to the entire labour force (including recent 
entrants) and to those already retired — are compensated. The faster the 
envisaged transition, the more the cash flow requirement is frontloaded. Under 
the minimal option, only new entrants to the labour market participate in the 
funded scheme. This reduces the cash flow requirements to the level of the 
operational deficit, which rises as expenditures remain for many years while 
contributions decrease continuously. The transition ends only when the last 
eligible person dies (after some 80 years). 
 
As we saw there aren’t easy solutions to reduce the burden on future generations of 
pension expenditures and basically all solutions are valid, but each country needs to 
agree, discuss and understand  which path they want follow, without that any reform is 
condemn to failure. 
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5 Our proposal 
 
 Johansson et al. (2008) highlighted the potential growth benefits of shifting the tax mix 
away from taxes on labor towards consumption taxes, Blumkin et al. (2012) also  present 
evidence from a real-effort experiment with real goods, where consistent with money 
illusion and tax misperception, when is introduced a tax on labor subjects reduce their 
labor supply by 33% on average compared to the no-tax treatment, significantly more 
than the 15% decrease in labor supply when is introduced an equivalent consumption 
tax. In particular there is a strong case to broaden VAT bases and reduce or eliminate 
products and services that beneficiate from reduce rates, due to revenue lost through the 
usage of reduced rates, In most countries the marginal source of general revenue is 
usually the VAT
24
, which is often both the largest and one of the most elastic revenue 
sources available (Bird and Smart (2012)). Barbone et al. (2013) estimated an average 
VRR Gap for the EU-27 (from 2000 until 2011) of 47% and a median of 49%, they also 
estimated the policy gap (is defined as the ratio between the VAT Total Tax Liability, 
total amount of estimated VAT payments on the basis of national accounts aggregates 
and the existing structure of rates and exemption)
25
 for the same countries and period 
with an average of 36% and a median of 29%, the interpretation of these results is that 
an important amount of revenue loss during the period 2000-2011 stemmed (in most 
countries) from choices made over time that have introduced and sometimes extended 
multiple rates and exemptions. 
OECD and KIPF (2014) argue that reduced rates could have benefit more the rich than 
the poor (e.g., reduced rates on hotel accommodation and restaurants) and Barbone et al. 
(2012)  point out that VAT fraud is influenced by the choices of base. 
According to OECD (2014d), almost in every country from OECD the employer 
contributes to social security (exceptions are Chile, Denmark and New Zealand) and all 
(except Chile), have personal income taxes (PIT), our proposal aims to the elimination 
of booth due to the increase of the incentives to work (Blumkin et al. (2012) and Thomas 
and Picos-Sánchez (2012)), a reduction in income taxes while increasing value added 
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 The VAT in 1965 represented on average 2% of total tax revenue in OECD countries, but in 2012, 
constitutes 19% of total revenue (OECD and KIPF (2014)). 
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Policy Gap is defined as the ratio between the VTTL(VAT Total Tax Liability, total amount of estimated 
VAT payments on the basis of national accounts aggregates and the existing structure of rates and 
exemptions) and the “ideal” VAT As Keen (2013) notes, the policy gap may be thought of as zero if a 
single VAT rate is applied perfectly, with no compliance gap, to all final consumption (and only to such 
consumption) – subject, of course to the caveats noted elsewhere about exactly how consumption is 
actually measured. In effect, this is equivalent to a measure of the extent to which the legal structure of the 
actual VAT embodies ‘tax expenditures’ as compared to the assumed normative standard of a uniform tax 
on all final consumption. This concept provides a useful summary measure of the extent to which the c-
inefficiency (VRR) ratio is attributable to political decisions embodied in tax law rather than to how well 
that law is enforced. 
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(VAT) and sales taxes is also associated with faster growth (Ormaechea and Yoo (2012) 
and Ufier (2014)), a shift to a consumption tax could reduce administrative costs 
compared to an income tax (McCaffery (2008)), there is a lot of space to increase the tax 
revenue through VAT as we can see o the estimated average VRR Gap for the EU-27 
(from 2000 until 2011) of 47% and a median of 49% ((Barbone et al. (2013)) and 
Correia (2010) shows that tax on consumption allows for redistributive policies with no 
costs in terms of efficiency. 
We propose the elimination of the PIT and its replacement for a unique VAT rate and 
elimination of extended multiple rates and exemptions, aiming for a 0% VRR. The total 
costs for employers will continue the same, (so the total nominal costs are the same for 
employers) which allows that future salary increases have reduced costs for employers 
and the creation of an individual social account, which is financed through: 
 Direct contributions, an amount is discounted directly in the employee salary 
 Indirect contributions, an amount of the VAT paid is returned to the consumer 
through a credit in his social account. 
The purpose of this individual social account should be a long term one, whose goal is to 
finance pensions for employees when they reach the end of their working years. The 
contributor should have the possibility to choose the profile of its investment and who is 
going to manage his money. In order to simplify the process there could be a default 
option, because as Benartzi and Thaler (2007) and Choi et al. (2004) showed people 
usually stick with this option. In order to avoid complications the default option could be 
a fund with 50% stocks, 50% bonds and managed privately to avoid political 
interference, but the participants could have the choice to choose any fund with any style 
as it happens in the Kiwi Saver in New Zealand
26
. Governments should only create a 
market where funds compete for the money of the contributors in order to reduce  
management costs as the Chilean experience shows (Holzmann (1997)), should also 
oblige funds to report their performances, commissions, incentivize international 
investment in order to reduce risk through diversification (Markowitz (1968)) and 
control and avoid collusion. There are several articles (e.g. Poterba et al. (2006) and 
Shiller (2005)) studying the performance of pension funds, but the best option usually 
depends on the risk profile of the investor. 
When the retirement age is reached, it should be mandatory the purchase of an annuity 
with the accumulated amount in order to finance the retiree old age expenses, the retiree 
could have the possibility to use a part of that value immediately, but it should be 
mandatory a guaranteed a minimum monthly income amount in old age in order to avoid 
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misuse of their lifetime savings. We recommend this, because Agarwal et. al (2009) 
found that after age 60, the prevalence of dementia roughly doubles every five years. By 
the time people reach their 80s, more than half will suffer from either dementia or other 
significant cognitive deficits. They also had great difficulty understanding simple 
measures of risk. When asked which numbers represented the biggest risk of getting a 
disease, 1 in 10, 1 in 100 or 1 in 1000, an astounding 29% of older adults (ages 65-94) 
could not answer the question correctly! (Peters (2008a), (2008b)). 
The pensioners will continue to contribute to their pensions through the indirect 
contributions, these will finance part of the actual pension and also create a buffer to 
cover the longevity risk (unexpected increases in life spans which can increase pension 
fund liabilities by as much as 10 percent (Antolin (2007)), direct SSC cease to exist 
when the retiree reaches retirement, so when retirement is reached the pensioner only 
makes indirect contributions. These indirect contributions post retirement could continue 
to have the same default profile of investment as the fund to where the retiree 
contributed previously, continuing to give the option to choose to him. 
The retirement age should be accordingly to the total accumulated capital, his life 
expectancy and the 70% net replacement rate target of the last salary (we suggest this 
value due to Antolin (2007) suggestion), despite being hard to define what level of 
replacement the pension replacement rate should target. A simple starting point is to say 
that standards of living in retirement should be the same as those enjoyed during 
working life. But working-age people may have to meet a number of needs which 
retirees no longer have, such as transport costs or work-related expenses. And people 
who were low earners during their working lives may need pension replacement rates of 
100%, or even higher. Those who enjoyed higher earnings may still have a very 
comfortable retirement with replacement rates substantially below 100%. After this 
amount being reached the pensioner could have the freedom to choose if he wants to 
continue to work, to retire or booth. So the option to for example work part-time 
receiving a salary and the pension should be available, in this case the rules continue to 
apply, the retiree pays direct and indirect contributions, from his salary and expenses.  
Before we develop our proposal, we are going to specify why we suggest an acquisition 
of an annuity. Annuities have the potential to solve some complex problems individuals 
struggle with, like when to retire and how much they can spend each year in retirement, 
and thus might be expected to be attractive for that reason (Benartzi et al. (2011)). Yaari 
(1965) wrote a seminal paper demonstrating that under some specific assumptions 
rational individuals with no bequest motive should convert all of their retirement wealth 
to an annuity at retirement. The argument is subtle yet compelling. Suppose you only 
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care about your own utility, and you do not know how long you are going to live. You 
can either invest your money in a bond or buy an annuity. Yaari shows that by buying an 
annuity you assure yourself a higher level of consumption in every year that you live, 
compared to holding the bond. The reason is that those who die early subsidize those 
who live a long time. In the literature, this is called the “mortality premium.” Since by 
assumption those who die early no longer care about consumption, they do not mind 
sharing their wealth with those lucky enough to still be around. In effect, an annuity is an 
insurance policy with a negative price. You increase your consumption and eliminate 
risk at the same time, so an annuity strictly dominates the investment alternative.  In 
order to make the annuity products safer a government guarantee could be provided, 
along the lines of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation for banks and the Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corporation for pension plans in USA or Deposit Guarantee Schemes 
in EU. A case can be made that the government should address this problem, perhaps by 
selling longevity bonds (Thomsen and Andersen (2007)) in which the yield adjusts to 
changes in life expectancy
27
. 
Now we will see how the payment of taxes and contributions to the social account will 
be made. Taxes will be paid through VAT and we will only have one rate and tax all 
consumption
28
 (this rate should be the same as the corporate and saving options in 
general to simplify the system), for now let´s assume a 25 % tax rate, where 10% goes to 
the individual social account and 15% for paying taxes (so 60% of 25% goes to taxes 
and 40% of the 25% goes to the social account).  
The transactions should tend to be exclusively be made by electronic means, in order to 
simplify the system, to reduce evasion (Schneider (2013) says:” Electronic payments 
can help countries increase revenues and reduce cash, the shadow economy’s  key 
enabler“), increasing by 10 % automatic payments annually for at least four consecutive 
years could shrink the shadow economy by 5% (Schneider (2013))
29
, the shadow 
economy comprises legal business activities that are performed outside the reach of 
government authorities. These activities typically fall into two categories that remain 
common across Europe. The first is undeclared work, which accounts for roughly two-
thirds of the shadow economy. It includes wages that workers and businesses do not 
declare to the government to avoid taxes or documentation. Undeclared work is 
widespread in construction, agriculture and household services (such as cleaning, 
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 We are not including for now tobacco and mineral oils due to its specific regulation, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/excise_duties/index_en.htm. 
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 Schneider (2013) is a work sponsored by Visa, so it could have some conflict of interest, but he 
mentions that Romania, which has established a national system for POS and online tax payment via bank 
card and managed to raise tax payments by card by 34 per cent year-on-year. 
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babysitting, elderly care, and tutoring). The other one-third comes from underreporting, 
which is when businesses (primarily those that deal heavily in cash, such as small shops, 
bars, and taxis) report only part of their income to avoid some of the tax burden 
(Schneider (2013)). Automatization of payments could also minimize compliance costs 
(like time, labour cost and expert advice) and administrative costs (those that are borne 
directly by the public sector, and indirectly by all taxpayers, like budgetary costs of 
revenue department  and judiciary and other costs related to dispute resolution) of VAT, 
but also other costs like psychological (Evans (2008), Lopes (2008) and James and 
Edwards (2010) have noted to the psychological costs induced by tax compliance
30
). We 
propose an automatic system, but it could also be available to cash payments. So how 
payment system would work?   
We assume that every citizen has a bank account and a debit, credit card or any other 
form (like the mobile phone or any the possibility to use a biometric form of payment, 
see e.g. Jain (2007)), the maintenance of the bank account and the possession of the form 
of payment should be free in order to incentive this form of payment. Central authorities 
should use the actual system or incentivize market players to create new forms of 
payment in order to simplify the payment system and to reduce administrative and 
psychological costs. 
The default option of the payment (to check the power of default options see Johnson 
and Goldstein (2003) and Choi et al.(2004)) is associated to the citizen fiscal number 
(ideally should only be necessary one number to identify the citizen, with no need for a 
ID, Social Security, Fiscal, etc. card) and automatically the tax amount is transferred to a 
state account and the rest for the seller, in our best knowledge the only proposal similar 
to this automatic procedure is Hombek (2009), but he proposes the creation of a bank 
account, to where the payment is transferred after the sale and only after the tax is 
transferred to the fiscal authority the seller as the possibility to access the net amount. 
Anyone should have at least 30 days to cancel the operation, and the fiscal authority 
would keep all the tax paid for 30 days ((Barbone et al. (2012) states that the average 
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 Evans (2008) goes on to note that “in addition to this generally accepted hard core of compliance costs, 
there are a number of other costs that need to be considered. For example, there is little doubt that there 
will always be a measure of psychological cost that is induced by the operation of the tax system. 
Taxpayers suffer stress, anxiety and frustration as a result of attempting to comply with their tax 
obligations. Lopes (2008) estimated the costs for a small sample of Portuguese taxpayers, she reached to 
the conclusion that those costs are higher for people older than 65 years, with lower levels of education 
and women, but she also highlights the difficult to calculate these costs, in terms of total costs including 
psychological ones she reached to an average cost of 63.8€ for those with punctual professional help and 
640.61€ for with professional help. James and Edwards (2010) list several interesting examples of 
behavioral and experimental research which appear to offer some promise of future practical relevance 
(e.g. Coleman and Freedman (2002)). In particular, it is perhaps worth noting that at least one such study 
(Hasseldine and Hansford, 2002) suggests that psychic costs are positively associated with financial costs 
of compliance. 
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refund period for EU countries is 30 days, so we use this number), when this deadline is 
over the fiscal authority should transfer the social security individual contribution to 
individual social account and make the calculations of the relation with seller, because 
the seller could have the right to be reimbursed
31
(for a description of how the VAT 
works see OECD and KIPF (2014)). The 30 days could be more, because it should be a 
fix date every month where the tax authority and the taxpayer settle their accounts. 
In this system the tax authority and social security managing entity should be the same 
in order to facilitate the relation with citizens, creating a more simple way to comply and 
to receive the reward (the social security contribution), and as Naritomi (2013) 
demonstrates for the Brazil case, taxpayers like to receive a reward for tax compliance, 
Commission (2013) also recommends a tax prize (deduction or reimbursement) in order 
to combat fraud. Because VAT has the advantage of refund if booth tax payers report the 
transaction this could create a chain effect that could eliminate or reduce evasion (as De 
Paula and Scheinkman (2010) observed), besides of returning a part of the tax to the tax 
payer in order to reinforce the incentive, it should be mandatory in every receipt or 
invoice to have the fiscal number if that is not the case, the one that paid the service or 
product if wants to prove that transaction, for some reason (refund, warranty, etc.), could 
only do it if the invoice or receipt mentions his fiscal number, that would happen in 
automatic way if the consumer used an electronic pay system, because the bank or any 
other entity that possesses the money from the consumer would provide the fiscal 
number automatically in the transaction and this must be the default option in order to 
simplify the payment process. The consumer must have the option to refuse to give is 
fiscal number, so the electronic payment system must provide this option.  
To stimulate the declaration of the amount to the labor force, labour costs could have a 
weight of 105% (for example the company pays 1000€ to the worker, in fiscal terms it 
would value 1050€), increasing with age, in order to stimulate companies to hire older 
workers (for example 105% for those until 30 years old, 107.5% for those between 30 
and 40 years old, and so on), because the world population is ageing (United Nations, 
(2013)), we need to stimulate more working years in order to prevent a slower GDP 
growth (Martins et al. (2005)). 
                                                          
31
 Under the invoice credit method (which is a “transaction based method”), each trader charges VAT at 
the rate specified for each supply and passes to the purchaser an invoice showing the amount of tax 
charged. The purchaser is in turn able to credit that input tax against the output tax it charges on its sales, 
remitting the balance to the tax authorities and receiving refunds when there are excess credits. This 
method is based on invoices that could, in principle, be cross-checked to pick up any overstatement of 
credit entitlement. By linking the tax credit on the purchaser’s inputs to the tax paid by the purchaser, the 
invoice credit method is designed to discourage fraud. 32 of the 33 OECD countries employing a VAT use 
the invoice credit method (OECD and KIPF (2014)). 
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In order to prevent local residents to make all their consumption outside the country 
where they receive their income, it should be mandatory that at least 50% of the total 
income be as consumed and declared in the local country, if that is not the case the direct 
social contributions of all the year are apprehended in their full amount as fine. Also if 
system was global, that is if system would be adopted by all countries, part of the VAT 
paid outside the residence country could be transferred to the Individual social security 
account. 
Some remarks not included on the previous development of the idea: 
1. In e-commerce transactions, it should be possible to automatically have the same 
method, so when the taxpayer is paying the product or service, automatically the 
seller with the data from the buyer should charge the VAT rate applied in country 
of the buyer and the same would happen, the tax is transferred automatically to 
local fiscal authority, this would imply a world connected system supervised by a 
world entity like for example the World Trade Organization, where all of those 
who want to have the possibility to use e-commerce, should be connected to the 
various fiscal entities and , according to the data from the seller, charge the VAT 
in order to don´t give them advantages in relation with local entities. 
2. In world without money paper, we could have the risk of the confiscation of 
financial assets, in this case, laws should be created to prevent this. 
3. In a world free of money paper, all our activities would have a digital registration, 
laws to prevent misuse of this data should be created. 
4. We mentioned before the 4 tiers of the present social security system, the first tier 
is a government-provided anti-poverty benefit, in our opinion this tier should 
continue to exist, because there could be people not able to save enough during 
their working years for some reason (long term unemployment, sickness, etc.) and 
in order to guarantee some harmony in society, governments should provide an 
anti-poverty benefit. This tier should be provided some cash pension but also 
should include free and easy access to long term care services, free or reduced 
prices for public transportation in order to facilitate the usage of healthcare 
services, so basically it should include free public services in order to guarantee a 
minimum quality of life for those benefiting from this tier. Of course the access to 
this tier should be highly controlled in order to avoid free riders. 
5. Our proposal intends to create a three tier social security system, so as we 
mentioned in the previous point, we think the first tier should be maintained and 
the same should happen to the present fourth tier. The fourth tier is voluntary and 
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supplementary. It includes private savings, voluntary occupational pension 
schemes, voluntary individual pension accounts, labour earnings, support from 
family members, and charity. So anyone that wants to save more than what is 
defined in our system should be allowed to do it. So the first tier is a government-
provided anti-poverty benefit, the second tier is funded benefits and third tier is 
voluntary and supplementary. 
6. As Blumkin et al. (2012) showed, the incentive to work be higher due to a bigger 
nominal salary, indirect tax have an anesthetic effect (Pinto (2011)) easing the 
psychological costs of paying taxes and in the case of the VAT could have an a 
chain effect of the declaration of transactions, but we could continue to have 
direct taxes and apply only our proposal to the functioning of the VAT. 
7. We mentioned that we also would tax savings, the system would function in the 
same way, capital gains and other forms of saving would be taxed with the same 
rate as the defined VAT and part of that tax would be transferred to the individual 
social account, because as Gordon et al. (2004) not taxing capital gains and 
extensive free saving accounts were introduced, it verifies that the total revenue 
decreases and it even could subsidize capital gains and Dynan et al. (2004) 
demonstrated the rich save more, so exempting savings could have a regressive 
impact and be a subsidy to those with higher income. 
8. In order to stimulate the ones with lower resources to declare that consumption 
and also to have an equity fiscal system, until a pre-determined amount of income 
a percentage of the tax paid is returned to the consumer, for example the 
consumer have an income of 6000 euro per year, and assuming a tax rate of 25%, 
where 60% goes to tax and the rest for the social security account, so from those 
60% let’s say half is returned to consumer, these reimbursements should be the 
most rapid possible in order to give the consumer the feeling that compensates to 
declare his consumption and also to maintain a reasonable level of income for 
those with less resources.  
9. We didn’t addressed other taxes like tobacco or property taxes, in our opinion 
those taxes could continue with the same rates and rules. In the case of tobacco 
for example we think also that a part of the tax should be transferred to the 
individual social account in order to encourage declaration of the consumption. 
One could argument that in that case a system with one rate would not apply, we 
disagree because the basic level of taxation could be the same with only a 
monetary addition in order to reach the actual levels of taxation for these 
products. 
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5.1 The transition between systems 
 
In our opinion the transition between the actual system, where we have a mix of direct 
and indirect tax system and in the majority of countries a 4 tier social security system 
should be done as quick as possible, but we should take some aspects in consideration: 
1. It would be necessary a large campaign to inform all citizens how the system 
works. 
2. Those who are not comfortable with digital payments should receive extra 
support. 
3. Businesses should receive some support in order to implement a digital payment 
only system. 
4. The new system should have at least one experimental year in order to check 
how it works and how society adapts to him. Also this would allow to understand 
its problems and to create solutions to resolve them. 
5. One of the hardest parts of this transition would be for sure the treatment of 
social security implicit debt. As Holzmann (1997) mentioned there are several 
strategies to go from an unfunded to funded pension system, in our opinion the 
something similar to the third strategy is the most adequate one, where all that 
discounted to the old system, so the entire labour force (including recent 
entrants) and to those already retired are compensated. Governments could try to 
discuss a reduction of this burden by proposing to the actual members some 
discount on their benefits. This would provoke a big jump in the levels of the 
explicit public debt, but as we saw the explicit government debt position (explicit 
and implicit debt positions) according to Ponds et al. (2011), is already highly 
correlated with the cost of financing debt, so probably there would not be a panic 
in financial markets due to this move. But to make sure that don’t happen, we 
think this new explicit debt should be treated differently, central banks could 
loan with 0% interest rate all the amount of this new explicit debt and allow only 
a % usage per year only to pay pensions of the all amount in order to avoid 
inflation escalations. The duration of this loan should be around 80 years, 
because the transition ends only when the last eligible person dies (after some 80 
years). 
Other author´s like Kaldor (1955), Hall et al. (1995) and McCaffery (2008) proposed 
new fiscal systems without much success, we hope that our proposal could find a 
different result.  
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5.2 Our theory put to test 
 
In this section we will use data from Portugal, first we are going to use a collective 
example and then an individual one and we also will check the differences between the 
revenue from the actual and the new system. For simplification we use data only for on 
country, but this model can be applied in any country with the specific adaptions. 
5.2.1 Aggregate example 
 
For this example we are going to use Portugal GDP data from INE (Instituto Nacional de 
Estatistica) for 2013 in order to compare the level of tax revenue and social security 
contributions that Portugal have in the actual system with our proposal. We are going to 
include different scenarios for shadow economy, because as Schneider (2013) mentions 
automatic payments could reduce shadow economy. So we are going to include a 0% 
level shadow economy, the same level of shadow economy as estimated by (Afonso 
(2014)) for Portugal in 2013 ( the value estimated was 26,81%) and a reduction of that 
value of 10% and 5%. Below our assumptions: 
 For the Domestic demand we used data from INE for 2013 and we added the 
weight of PIT in Domestic Demand, so for 2013 the total domestic demand was 
167.894,5 M€ and Total PIT was 19684.2 M€, so 11.7% of total domestic 
demand, so for the base scenario 187.578,7 M€ (167.894.5*(1+11.7%)) 
 For each scenario we reduce the level of shadow economy in 5% 
 For each scenario we estimated the level of VAT tax rate and VAT SSC rate 
needed in the new system to have the same level of revenue as the actual system, 
so column 6 and 7 represent the 2013 revenue for direct and indirect tax and 
SSC, respectively in the actual system. Columns 8 represent the VAT rate in new 
system needed to get the same level of revenue as the actual one. Column 9 
represent the rate needed in the new system to have the same SSC revenue, here 
we are ignoring the direct contributions already made by individuals. 
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Table 6: Comparison between the actual system (AC) and our proposed system (NS) for Portugal. 
Domestic Demand (in 
M€) (1) 
187.578,7 196.957,7 206.336,6 215.715,5 225.094,5 237.868,6 
Level of Shadow 
economy (2) 26,81% 21,81% 16,81% 11,81% 6,81% 0,00% 
Total Tax colected NS 
(15%) (3) 28136,80 29543,648 30950,48 32357,32 33764,16 35680,28 
SSC NS (10%) (4) 18757,87 19695,77 20633,66 21571,55 22509,45 23786,86 
Proposed VAT Rate (5) 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 
Total Tax colected AC 
(6) 43335,3 43335,3 43335,3 43335,3 43335,3 43335,3 
Social contribuitons AC 
(7) 15115,5 15115,5 15115,5 15115,5 15115,5 15115,5 
VAT Tax rate (8) 23,1% 22,0% 21,0% 20,1% 19,3% 18,2% 
VAT SSC Rate (9) 8,1% 7,7% 7,3% 7,0% 6,7% 6,4% 
Total VAT Rate (10) 31,2% 29,7% 28,3% 27,1% 26,0% 24,6% 
Source : INE 
In the above table we see that only with 0% of shadow economy we reach a global of 
25% of the VAT rate, despite with a different mix. In all other cases the rate is above 
25% and our proposed mix is never reached. Even with a 0% level of shadow economy 
we don’t reach the level of revenue in actual scenario, we get behind 18%, while in the 
base scenario the difference reaches 35%. So it seems that our proposed rates are 
insufficient, despite we are ignoring external effects (like reduction of unemployment 
expenses, increase of administrative efficiency, etc.), they don’t present a similar level of 
revenue as the actual ones. We need also to remember that we are not including the VAT 
Gap, that according to Barbone et al. (2013) represented in 2011 for Portugal 0.8% of 
the GDP. 
For the base scenario we observe a 31.2% global VAT rate to reach the same level of 
revenue for tax and SSC. This level seems too high and could incentivize people to find 
new forms to escape taxation, increasing the level of shadow economy. On the other 
hand we need to consider that net salaries will increase (in the following section for 
someone with 1000€ gross salary, the increase is around 25%, but someone with the 
minimum salary is of 6.3%), despite less than the increase of 36% from 23% (actual top 
VAT rate in Portugal) to 31.2%.  
5.2.2 Individual example for the actual system 
 Annual gross Salary:14000 € (in Portugal the salary is paid 14 times, so 1000€ 
per month) 
 Meal subsidy:  1210 € (assuming 22 working days in 11 months and 5 € per day, 
we assume 1 month for vacations and holydays) 
 Social security contribution rate from the employee: 11%  
 Social security contribution rate from the employer: 23.75% 
  
 
37 
 
 Personal income tax :13.15%32 (using data from Personal income tax code from 
Portugal and ignoring any added deduction) 
 VAT rate: 20% (Portugal have 3 rates for the VAT 23%, 13% and 6%, but the 
large majority of products and services are subject to the 23% so we use a 20% 
rate), and we assume that the citizen consumes all is available income in taxable 
goods in Portugal at the average rate of 20%. 
For the new system: 
 Annual gross Salary: 18535 € (in Portugal the salary is paid 14 times, so 1000€ 
per month plus the meal subsidy of 1210 plus the employer SSC of 3325€ 
(23.75%*14000€) that now is paid directly to the individual, and as we said the 
nominal labor costs are maintained). 
 Meal subsidy: 0€, all retributions from the employer to the employee are 
included on his salary without any deduction in order to simplify the tax system. 
 Social security contribution rate from the employee: 20%. 
 Social security contribution rate from the employer: 0%, in the new system the 
employer no longer pays SSC. 
 Personal income tax: 0%, in the new system PIT disappears. 
 VAT rate: 25% for all products and services, special or reduced taxes disappear 
and all services and products are taxed in order to keep the system simple and to 
eliminate the VRR Gap for the Eu-27 of 49%, where 15 p.p. refers to tax and 10 
p.p. to social personal security account, the highest rate in EU is 25%, so we 
selected this value. And again we assume 0% of saving. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
32
 Using the 2015 PIT from Portugal (check 
http://info.portaldasfinancas.gov.pt/pt/docs/Conteudos_1pagina/NEWS_Portuguese_Tax_System.htm), 
the PIT is calculated in the following way, Gross salary (14000€)-Specific deductions (according to the 
Portuguese tax code its 4104€)=9896€* tax rate (this value is splinted by two levels, the first 7000 € is 
subject to a rate of 14,5% the next level 2896€ (9896-7000) is subject to a tax rate of 28,5%, what gives a 
final value of 1840,36€ (1840,36/14000=13,15%). 
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Table 7: Comparison between the actual system and our proposed system for Portugal 
  Actual system New system Adapted new system 
Data Values Rate Values Rate Values Rate 
Anual gross salary 14.000,00 €   18.535,00 €   18.535,00 €   
Employee SSC 1.540,00 € 11,00% 3.707,00 € 20,00% 3.707,00 € 20,00% 
Meal 1.210,00 €   0,00 €   0,00 €   
PIT 1.840,36 € 13,15% 0,00 € 0,00% 0,00 € 0,00% 
Net Salary 11.829,64 €   14.828,00 €   14.828,00 €   
Employeer SSC 3.325,00 € 23,75% 0,00 € 0,00% 0,00 € 0,00% 
              
Total Employer Costs 18.535,00 €   18.535,00 €   18.535,00 €   
Employee salary SSC 1.540,00 €   3.707,00 €   3.707,00 €   
Employee VAT SSC 0,00 € 0,00% 1.482,80 € 10,00% 1.201,07 € 8,10% 
VAT 2.365,93 € 20,00% 2.224,20 € 15,00% 3.425,27 € 23,10% 
              
Total tax 4.206,29 € 30,04% 2.224,20 € 12,00% 3.425,27 € 18,48% 
Total SSC 4.865,00 € 26,25% 5.189,80 € 28,00% 4.908,07 € 26,48% 
Source: INE 
The net salary increases by 25.35%, the total tax is reduced by 47.12% and the SSC 
increase by 6.7%. The saving rate would be automatically of 28% above the 15% 
mentioned by Antolin (2009) necessary to reach 70% replacement of the last salary 
(remember that he assumes a constant return rate of 6%, what could be optimistic) and 
above the actual 26.25% if we consider all the amount paid by the employer. If we 
simulate the same case but for someone with the minimum salary in Portugal in 2013 of 
485€ per month and without PIT, we get a reduction of 20% of the total tax collected 
and an increase of 14% in total SSC, but if we admit a devolution of half of VAT paid 
and so an effective 7.5% charge the reduction of the total tax collect rises to 60%. 
We also include an adapted version to include the scenario where the rates are the ones 
we get in collective example for the base scenario where the VAT tax rate needs to be  
23.1% and the SSC needs to be 8.1% in order to get the same revenue as the actual 
system. In this case the reduction on tax revenue is of 18.57% and the SSC raises only 
0.89%.  
5.2.3 Individual example of a future pensioner  
Regarding the individual future pension we also estimated how much a pensioner could 
earn during his pension. Here are the assumptions: 
 A monthly salary of 1235.67€ (so the 14828€ annual salary estimated in table 3 
divided by 12 months). 
 An increase of the salary of 1% per year in order to give a more conservative 
view. 
 We simulate 5 cases of working careers, 25, 30, 35, 40 and 45 years.  
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 A contribution rate of 28% (as shown in table 3) and the amount is only used for 
pension payment. 
 The amount is invested in a portfolio with 50% stocks and 50% bonds, where the 
return for bonds are of 0,16% per month (1,1% per year) and for stocks of 0,42%  
per month (5,2% per year), we use data from Credit Suisse Global Investment 
Returns Yearbook 2015 (Dimson (2015)). 
 A retirement period of 20 years. 
Table 8: Simulation of retiree pension in 45 years using our proposal 
Period 
Initial 
Salary 
Initial 
Contribuiton Monthly Return Total Capital Final Pension Last Salary 
45 years 1.235,67 € 345,99 € 0,29% 522.144,20 € 3.001,61 € 1.858,14 € 
40 years 1.235,67 € 345,99 € 0,29% 411.802,63 € 2.367,30 € 1.767,95 € 
35 years 1.235,67 € 345,99 € 0,29% 320.115,56 € 1.840,22 € 1.698,97 € 
30 years 1.235,67 € 345,99 € 0,29% 244.066,00 € 1.403,04 € 1.616,51 € 
25 years 1.235,67 € 345,99 € 0,29% 181.145,22 € 1.041,33 € 1.616,51 € 
Source: (Dimson (2015) and author´s calculations.33 
 
In the above table we can verify that the final pension exceeds the last salary in 62% in a 
45 year scenario and until 35 years of contributions the pension exceeds the last salary, 
for the 30 year scenario we reach 86% and in the 25 year scenario the pension represents 
64% of the last salary, what means that only in this scenario the suggested replacement 
rate of 70 % by Antolin (2007) isn’t reached. We don’t include on this simulation the 
contributions post retireme, which in our proposal could represent a more sustainable 
pension system. But we also need to remember that we didn’t include unemployment 
and situations of very short careers due to some misfortune. We can’t affirm that our 
system is more sustainable than the actual one. Even tough according to OECD (2013a) 
for Portugal the net replacement rate for a median earner is 65,6% in line with our 
scenario of 25 years of contributions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
33
 See appendix 1 for more detail on calculations 
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6 Conclusions and suggestions  
6.1 Answer to our questions 
 
It is possible to eliminate income taxes and maintain the same level of tax revenue?  
The answer is no if we consider a 25% global VAT rate, in our simulations we can’t 
reach the same tax revenue booth in an aggregate and individual level. In aggregate level 
in a state where the level of shadow economy is as Afonso (2014) estimated we only can 
reach that level with 31.2% VAT rate, where 23.1% refers to tax, only with a 0% level 
of shadow economy we reach a VAT rate of 25%. 
It is possible to eliminate or reduce the “underground” economy? 
The answer is inconclusive, because we can’t test the above question, but according to 
Schneider (2013) states that increasing by 10 % automatic payments annually for at least 
four consecutive years could shrink the shadow economy by 5%, so we believe that our 
suggestion of a passage to a no money paper world could reduce shadow economy 
improving public finances, as show in the example from Afonso (2014), where if this 
value was 0% for Portugal and using a 20% overall tax burden the fiscal deficit would be 
for 2012 of 0.85% instead of 6.43%. 
It possible to have an individual social security account that provides an adequate 
income when necessary? 
Our findings are inconclusive, because we simulate a very simple case without taking 
into account unemployment and other misfortunes, but in our simulation with 35 years 
or more of social security contributions we have a final pension with a value superior to 
the last salary and even with 25 years we reach a replacement level of 64% without 
taking into account the post retirement contributions. 
6.2 Main Contributions 
The main contributions of this study to the world of academic knowledge lay on these 
aspects: 
a) In our best knowledge, our proposal can’t be found in current literature, but we 
can say that is a collection of ideas from several authors and goes on line with the 
recent recommendations from institutions like IMF and OECD tend to suggest a 
shift from direct to indirect taxation. In fact there are studies that empirically 
show that this shift can increase labour supply (Blumkin et al. (2012)), that VAT 
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adoption is associated with an increase in growth and investment as well as lower 
inflation and government spending as a share of GDP (Ufier (2014)) and a 
reduction in income taxes while increasing VAT and sales taxes is also 
associated with faster growth (Ormaechea and Yoo (2012)). Regarding the 
financing of SS other authors also proposed something similar (e.g. Bird and 
Smart (2012) and Levy (2010)), despite in a different way, the change or a least a 
the increase on weight of VAT in financing SSC, but our proposal goes farther 
including a passage to a funded pension system, the inclusion of a totally 
automatized payment system in order to reduce the weight of shadow economy 
and the elimination of any exemptions in VAT. But the devolution of tax paid as 
a contribution to an individual social security account is our opinion the most 
innovative aspect of this study, that we hope can help future authors and policy 
makers to increase the sustainability of social security systems and the saving 
rates. 
b) We also analyzed how the transition between systems could be made we hope 
that some of our remarks could be useful for policy makers. 
c) Finally we made an approach to booth the tax and social security systems, the 
most important systems in public finances, when usually booth are treated 
separately, but in our opinion there are interconnected and if we want to counter 
the problems that both face,  futures studies should take that into account. 
6.3 Limitations and suggestions for further research 
We need to work and save more that is the message from the latest Pensions at a Glance 
(OECD (2013a)), due to the reduction of the fertility rate, an ageing population and the 
past promises made to current and future retirees. Public expenses with pensions will 
grow (OECD (2014c)), and people don’t seem to save enough to face their retirement 
years according to OECD. 
The financing of future pensions come essentially from taxes (OECD (2013a)) and at 
moment we have already a tax wedge on labor of 35.9% in 2013 in OECD countries 
(OECD (2014d)). 
The most recent proposals from institutions like IMF and OECD tend to suggest a shift 
from direct to indirect taxation, the reasoning of these proposals are mainly connected to 
find a way to maintain the actual levels of taxation while increasing employment.  
Taking this into consideration we look propose a new form to finance public expenses 
and for a more sustainable pension system, while incentivizing labor supply, firms to 
hire and the reduction of the shadow economy. We proposed basically a system where 
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all taxation is made indirectly with only one rate and the elimination of any exemption. 
We propose a system where all taxes are financed by consumption and saving and part 
of tax paid is transferred to individual social security account.  
We tested our proposal for the case of Portugal in a simplified way, and we found that 
the tax needed to reach the current levels of tax revenue would be approximately of 
31.2%, in our opinion probably too high, what could increase and not reduce the actuals 
levels of shadow economy. We also tested the income provided to pensioners, where we 
found that for contribuitons of 35 years or more the pensioner could reveive a pension 
higher than his last salary and even with 25 years the replacement rate is similar to the 
actual one. 
Our proposal has the benefits of providing a very simple system with only one tax, one 
rate, without exemptions, the reward of declaring all consumption and a money paper 
free world. In theory these benefits seem to be in right direction but our study present 
several limitations, first we don’t test it in all countries, second we don’t take into 
account the full the effects on GDP of the change of the tax system, like employment, 
inflation and changes in consumer behavior, third, we also don’t present a quantification 
of how much public systems and firms could save with a system with only a indirect 
system, fourth we don’t quantify the psychological costs from this change to policy 
makers, consumers and firms, fifth we don’t test our system with high levels or 
prolonged situations of unemployment to verify if our system is able to face this 
situation, sixth we don’t quantify the costs to firms of having an electronic payment 
system, seventh we were not able to verify the effects of our proposal in shadow 
economy, eight our simulations are based in very simple assumptions what could 
misrepresent our findings. 
Our suggestions would be for future studies, that all the previous limitations were taken 
into account and quantified in order to give a more robustness to future works. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Calculation of the future pension for a retiree in 45 years 
Month M Salary M Contr Salaries 
inc 
BMR SMR Return Intial Capital Final Capital 
1 1.235,67 € 345,99 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 0,99 € 345,99 € 346,98 € 
2 1.235,67 € 345,99 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1,98 € 692,96 € 694,95 € 
3 1.235,67 € 345,99 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 2,98 € 1.040,93 € 1.043,91 € 
4 1.235,67 € 345,99 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 3,98 € 1.389,90 € 1.393,87 € 
5 1.235,67 € 345,99 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 4,98 € 1.739,86 € 1.744,84 € 
6 1.235,67 € 345,99 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 5,98 € 2.090,82 € 2.096,80 € 
7 1.235,67 € 345,99 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 6,99 € 2.442,79 € 2.449,78 € 
8 1.235,67 € 345,99 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 8,00 € 2.795,76 € 2.803,76 € 
9 1.235,67 € 345,99 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 9,01 € 3.149,75 € 3.158,76 € 
10 1.235,67 € 345,99 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 10,03 € 3.504,75 € 3.514,77 € 
11 1.235,67 € 345,99 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 11,04 € 3.860,76 € 3.871,80 € 
12 1.235,67 € 345,99 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 12,07 € 4.217,79 € 4.229,85 € 
13 1.248,02 € 349,45 € 1% 0,15% 0,42% 13,10 € 4.579,30 € 4.592,40 € 
14 1.248,02 € 349,45 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 14,14 € 4.941,85 € 4.955,98 € 
15 1.248,02 € 349,45 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 15,18 € 5.305,43 € 5.320,61 € 
16 1.248,02 € 349,45 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 16,22 € 5.670,05 € 5.686,27 € 
17 1.248,02 € 349,45 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 17,27 € 6.035,72 € 6.052,98 € 
18 1.248,02 € 349,45 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 18,31 € 6.402,43 € 6.420,74 € 
19 1.248,02 € 349,45 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 19,37 € 6.770,19 € 6.789,56 € 
20 1.248,02 € 349,45 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 20,42 € 7.139,00 € 7.159,43 € 
21 1.248,02 € 349,45 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 21,48 € 7.508,87 € 7.530,35 € 
22 1.248,02 € 349,45 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 22,54 € 7.879,80 € 7.902,34 € 
23 1.248,02 € 349,45 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 23,60 € 8.251,79 € 8.275,39 € 
24 1.248,02 € 349,45 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 24,67 € 8.624,84 € 8.649,51 € 
25 1.248,02 € 349,45 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 25,74 € 8.998,96 € 9.024,70 € 
26 1.260,50 € 352,94 € 1% 0,15% 0,42% 26,83 € 9.377,64 € 9.404,46 € 
27 1.260,50 € 352,94 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 27,91 € 9.757,40 € 9.785,32 € 
28 1.260,50 € 352,94 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 29,00 € 10.138,26 € 10.167,26 € 
29 1.260,50 € 352,94 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 30,09 € 10.520,20 € 10.550,29 € 
30 1.260,50 € 352,94 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 31,19 € 10.903,23 € 10.934,42 € 
31 1.260,50 € 352,94 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 32,29 € 11.287,36 € 11.319,65 € 
32 1.260,50 € 352,94 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 33,39 € 11.672,59 € 11.705,98 € 
33 1.260,50 € 352,94 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 34,50 € 12.058,93 € 12.093,42 € 
34 1.260,50 € 352,94 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 35,60 € 12.446,36 € 12.481,97 € 
35 1.260,50 € 352,94 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 36,72 € 12.834,91 € 12.871,62 € 
36 1.260,50 € 352,94 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 37,83 € 13.224,56 € 13.262,39 € 
37 1.260,50 € 352,94 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 38,95 € 13.615,33 € 13.654,28 € 
38 1.260,50 € 352,94 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 40,07 € 14.007,22 € 14.047,29 € 
39 1.273,11 € 356,47 € 1% 0,15% 0,42% 41,20 € 14.403,76 € 14.444,96 € 
40 1.273,11 € 356,47 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 42,34 € 14.801,43 € 14.843,77 € 
41 1.273,11 € 356,47 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 43,48 € 15.200,24 € 15.243,73 € 
42 1.273,11 € 356,47 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 44,63 € 15.600,20 € 15.644,82 € 
43 1.273,11 € 356,47 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 45,77 € 16.001,29 € 16.047,06 € 
44 1.273,11 € 356,47 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 46,92 € 16.403,54 € 16.450,46 € 
45 1.273,11 € 356,47 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 48,08 € 16.806,93 € 16.855,01 € 
46 1.273,11 € 356,47 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 49,23 € 17.211,48 € 17.260,71 € 
47 1.273,11 € 356,47 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 50,40 € 17.617,18 € 17.667,58 € 
48 1.273,11 € 356,47 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 51,56 € 18.024,05 € 18.075,61 € 
49 1.273,11 € 356,47 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 52,73 € 18.432,08 € 18.484,80 € 
50 1.273,11 € 356,47 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 53,90 € 18.841,27 € 18.895,17 € 
51 1.273,11 € 356,47 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 55,07 € 19.251,64 € 19.306,71 € 
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52 1.285,84 € 360,04 € 1% 0,15% 0,42% 56,26 € 19.666,75 € 19.723,00 € 
53 1.285,84 € 360,04 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 57,45 € 20.083,04 € 20.140,49 € 
54 1.285,84 € 360,04 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 58,64 € 20.500,52 € 20.559,17 € 
55 1.285,84 € 360,04 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 59,84 € 20.919,20 € 20.979,04 € 
56 1.285,84 € 360,04 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 61,04 € 21.339,08 € 21.400,12 € 
57 1.285,84 € 360,04 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 62,25 € 21.760,15 € 21.822,40 € 
58 1.285,84 € 360,04 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 63,45 € 22.182,43 € 22.245,89 € 
59 1.285,84 € 360,04 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 64,67 € 22.605,92 € 22.670,59 € 
60 1.285,84 € 360,04 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 65,88 € 23.030,62 € 23.096,51 € 
61 1.285,84 € 360,04 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 67,10 € 23.456,54 € 23.523,64 € 
62 1.285,84 € 360,04 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 68,32 € 23.883,67 € 23.952,00 € 
63 1.285,84 € 360,04 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 69,55 € 24.312,03 € 24.381,58 € 
64 1.285,84 € 360,04 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 70,77 € 24.741,61 € 24.812,39 € 
65 1.298,70 € 363,64 € 1% 0,15% 0,42% 72,02 € 25.176,02 € 25.248,04 € 
66 1.298,70 € 363,64 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 73,26 € 25.611,68 € 25.684,94 € 
67 1.298,70 € 363,64 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 74,51 € 26.048,57 € 26.123,09 € 
68 1.298,70 € 363,64 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 75,77 € 26.486,72 € 26.562,49 € 
69 1.298,70 € 363,64 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 77,02 € 26.926,13 € 27.003,15 € 
70 1.298,70 € 363,64 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 78,28 € 27.366,79 € 27.445,07 € 
71 1.298,70 € 363,64 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 79,55 € 27.808,71 € 27.888,25 € 
72 1.298,70 € 363,64 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 80,82 € 28.251,89 € 28.332,71 € 
73 1.298,70 € 363,64 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 82,09 € 28.696,34 € 28.778,43 € 
74 1.298,70 € 363,64 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 83,36 € 29.142,06 € 29.225,43 € 
75 1.298,70 € 363,64 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 84,64 € 29.589,06 € 29.673,70 € 
76 1.298,70 € 363,64 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 85,92 € 30.037,34 € 30.123,26 € 
77 1.298,70 € 363,64 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 87,21 € 30.486,90 € 30.574,11 € 
78 1.311,69 € 367,27 € 1% 0,15% 0,42% 88,51 € 30.941,38 € 31.029,89 € 
79 1.311,69 € 367,27 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 89,81 € 31.397,16 € 31.486,98 € 
80 1.311,69 € 367,27 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 91,12 € 31.854,25 € 31.945,37 € 
81 1.311,69 € 367,27 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 92,43 € 32.312,64 € 32.405,07 € 
82 1.311,69 € 367,27 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 93,75 € 32.772,34 € 32.866,09 € 
83 1.311,69 € 367,27 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 95,07 € 33.233,36 € 33.328,43 € 
84 1.311,69 € 367,27 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 96,39 € 33.695,70 € 33.792,09 € 
85 1.311,69 € 367,27 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 97,72 € 34.159,36 € 34.257,08 € 
86 1.311,69 € 367,27 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 99,05 € 34.624,35 € 34.723,39 € 
87 1.311,69 € 367,27 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 100,38 € 35.090,67 € 35.191,04 € 
88 1.311,69 € 367,27 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 101,72 € 35.558,32 € 35.660,03 € 
89 1.311,69 € 367,27 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 103,06 € 36.027,31 € 36.130,36 € 
90 1.311,69 € 367,27 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 104,40 € 36.497,64 € 36.602,04 € 
91 1.324,80 € 370,94 € 1% 0,15% 0,42% 105,76 € 36.972,98 € 37.078,75 € 
92 1.324,80 € 370,94 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 107,13 € 37.449,69 € 37.556,82 € 
93 1.324,80 € 370,94 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 108,49 € 37.927,76 € 38.036,26 € 
94 1.324,80 € 370,94 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 109,87 € 38.407,20 € 38.517,07 € 
95 1.324,80 € 370,94 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 111,24 € 38.888,01 € 38.999,26 € 
96 1.324,80 € 370,94 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 112,62 € 39.370,20 € 39.482,82 € 
97 1.324,80 € 370,94 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 114,00 € 39.853,77 € 39.967,77 € 
98 1.324,80 € 370,94 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 115,39 € 40.338,71 € 40.454,11 € 
99 1.324,80 € 370,94 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 116,78 € 40.825,05 € 40.941,83 € 
100 1.324,80 € 370,94 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 118,18 € 41.312,78 € 41.430,96 € 
101 1.324,80 € 370,94 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 119,58 € 41.801,90 € 41.921,48 € 
102 1.324,80 € 370,94 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 120,98 € 42.292,42 € 42.413,40 € 
103 1.324,80 € 370,94 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 122,39 € 42.784,35 € 42.906,73 € 
104 1.338,05 € 374,65 € 1% 0,15% 0,42% 123,81 € 43.281,39 € 43.405,20 € 
105 1.338,05 € 374,65 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 125,24 € 43.779,85 € 43.905,09 € 
106 1.338,05 € 374,65 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 126,67 € 44.279,74 € 44.406,40 € 
107 1.338,05 € 374,65 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 128,10 € 44.781,06 € 44.909,16 € 
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108 1.338,05 € 374,65 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 129,54 € 45.283,81 € 45.413,35 € 
109 1.338,05 € 374,65 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 130,98 € 45.788,00 € 45.918,98 € 
110 1.338,05 € 374,65 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 132,43 € 46.293,64 € 46.426,06 € 
111 1.338,05 € 374,65 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 133,88 € 46.800,72 € 46.934,59 € 
112 1.338,05 € 374,65 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 135,33 € 47.309,25 € 47.444,58 € 
113 1.338,05 € 374,65 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 136,79 € 47.819,23 € 47.956,02 € 
114 1.338,05 € 374,65 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 138,25 € 48.330,68 € 48.468,93 € 
115 1.338,05 € 374,65 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 139,72 € 48.843,58 € 48.983,30 € 
116 1.338,05 € 374,65 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 141,19 € 49.357,96 € 49.499,15 € 
117 1.351,43 € 378,40 € 1% 0,15% 0,42% 142,68 € 49.877,55 € 50.020,23 € 
118 1.351,43 € 378,40 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 144,17 € 50.398,63 € 50.542,80 € 
119 1.351,43 € 378,40 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 145,66 € 50.921,20 € 51.066,86 € 
120 1.351,43 € 378,40 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 147,16 € 51.445,26 € 51.592,42 € 
121 1.351,43 € 378,40 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 148,67 € 51.970,82 € 52.119,49 € 
122 1.351,43 € 378,40 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 150,17 € 52.497,89 € 52.648,06 € 
123 1.351,43 € 378,40 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 151,69 € 53.026,46 € 53.178,15 € 
124 1.351,43 € 378,40 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 153,20 € 53.556,55 € 53.709,75 € 
125 1.351,43 € 378,40 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 154,72 € 54.088,15 € 54.242,87 € 
126 1.351,43 € 378,40 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 156,25 € 54.621,27 € 54.777,52 € 
127 1.351,43 € 378,40 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 157,78 € 55.155,92 € 55.313,70 € 
128 1.351,43 € 378,40 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 159,31 € 55.692,10 € 55.851,41 € 
129 1.351,43 € 378,40 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 160,85 € 56.229,81 € 56.390,66 € 
130 1.364,94 € 382,18 € 1% 0,15% 0,42% 162,40 € 56.772,85 € 56.935,25 € 
131 1.364,94 € 382,18 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 163,96 € 57.317,43 € 57.481,39 € 
132 1.364,94 € 382,18 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 165,52 € 57.863,58 € 58.029,10 € 
133 1.364,94 € 382,18 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 167,09 € 58.411,28 € 58.578,37 € 
134 1.364,94 € 382,18 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 168,66 € 58.960,56 € 59.129,22 € 
135 1.364,94 € 382,18 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 170,24 € 59.511,40 € 59.681,64 € 
136 1.364,94 € 382,18 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 171,82 € 60.063,82 € 60.235,64 € 
137 1.364,94 € 382,18 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 173,40 € 60.617,82 € 60.791,23 € 
138 1.364,94 € 382,18 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 174,99 € 61.173,41 € 61.348,40 € 
139 1.364,94 € 382,18 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 176,58 € 61.730,58 € 61.907,17 € 
140 1.364,94 € 382,18 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 178,18 € 62.289,35 € 62.467,54 € 
141 1.364,94 € 382,18 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 179,79 € 62.849,72 € 63.029,51 € 
142 1.364,94 € 382,18 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 181,39 € 63.411,69 € 63.593,08 € 
143 1.378,59 € 386,01 € 1% 0,15% 0,42% 183,02 € 63.979,09 € 64.162,11 € 
144 1.378,59 € 386,01 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 184,64 € 64.548,11 € 64.732,76 € 
145 1.378,59 € 386,01 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 186,28 € 65.118,76 € 65.305,04 € 
146 1.378,59 € 386,01 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 187,91 € 65.691,05 € 65.878,96 € 
147 1.378,59 € 386,01 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 189,56 € 66.264,97 € 66.454,52 € 
148 1.378,59 € 386,01 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 191,20 € 66.840,53 € 67.031,73 € 
149 1.378,59 € 386,01 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 192,85 € 67.417,74 € 67.610,59 € 
150 1.378,59 € 386,01 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 194,51 € 67.996,59 € 68.191,10 € 
151 1.378,59 € 386,01 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 196,17 € 68.577,11 € 68.773,28 € 
152 1.378,59 € 386,01 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 197,83 € 69.159,29 € 69.357,12 € 
153 1.378,59 € 386,01 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 199,50 € 69.743,13 € 69.942,63 € 
154 1.378,59 € 386,01 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 201,18 € 70.328,64 € 70.529,82 € 
155 1.378,59 € 386,01 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 202,86 € 70.915,82 € 71.118,68 € 
156 1.392,38 € 389,87 € 1% 0,15% 0,42% 204,55 € 71.508,55 € 71.713,10 € 
157 1.392,38 € 389,87 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 206,26 € 72.102,97 € 72.309,22 € 
158 1.392,38 € 389,87 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 207,96 € 72.699,09 € 72.907,05 € 
159 1.392,38 € 389,87 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 209,67 € 73.296,92 € 73.506,59 € 
160 1.392,38 € 389,87 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 211,39 € 73.896,45 € 74.107,84 € 
161 1.392,38 € 389,87 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 213,11 € 74.497,71 € 74.710,81 € 
162 1.392,38 € 389,87 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 214,83 € 75.100,68 € 75.315,51 € 
163 1.392,38 € 389,87 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 216,56 € 75.705,38 € 75.921,94 € 
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164 1.392,38 € 389,87 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 218,29 € 76.311,80 € 76.530,10 € 
165 1.392,38 € 389,87 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 220,03 € 76.919,96 € 77.140,00 € 
166 1.392,38 € 389,87 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 221,78 € 77.529,86 € 77.751,64 € 
167 1.392,38 € 389,87 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 223,53 € 78.141,51 € 78.365,04 € 
168 1.392,38 € 389,87 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 225,28 € 78.754,90 € 78.980,19 € 
169 1.406,30 € 393,77 € 1% 0,15% 0,42% 227,05 € 79.373,95 € 79.601,01 € 
170 1.406,30 € 393,77 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 228,83 € 79.994,77 € 80.223,60 € 
171 1.406,30 € 393,77 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 230,61 € 80.617,37 € 80.847,98 € 
172 1.406,30 € 393,77 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 232,40 € 81.241,74 € 81.474,14 € 
173 1.406,30 € 393,77 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 234,19 € 81.867,91 € 82.102,09 € 
174 1.406,30 € 393,77 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 235,98 € 82.495,86 € 82.731,84 € 
175 1.406,30 € 393,77 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 237,79 € 83.125,61 € 83.363,40 € 
176 1.406,30 € 393,77 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 239,59 € 83.757,16 € 83.996,75 € 
177 1.406,30 € 393,77 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 241,40 € 84.390,52 € 84.631,92 € 
178 1.406,30 € 393,77 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 243,22 € 85.025,69 € 85.268,91 € 
179 1.406,30 € 393,77 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 245,04 € 85.662,67 € 85.907,72 € 
180 1.406,30 € 393,77 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 246,87 € 86.301,48 € 86.548,35 € 
181 1.406,30 € 393,77 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 248,70 € 86.942,12 € 87.190,82 € 
182 1.420,37 € 397,70 € 1% 0,15% 0,42% 250,55 € 87.588,53 € 87.839,08 € 
183 1.420,37 € 397,70 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 252,41 € 88.236,78 € 88.489,19 € 
184 1.420,37 € 397,70 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 254,27 € 88.886,89 € 89.141,16 € 
185 1.420,37 € 397,70 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 256,13 € 89.538,86 € 89.794,99 € 
186 1.420,37 € 397,70 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 258,00 € 90.192,69 € 90.450,70 € 
187 1.420,37 € 397,70 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 259,88 € 90.848,40 € 91.108,28 € 
188 1.420,37 € 397,70 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 261,76 € 91.505,98 € 91.767,74 € 
189 1.420,37 € 397,70 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 263,65 € 92.165,44 € 92.429,09 € 
190 1.420,37 € 397,70 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 265,54 € 92.826,79 € 93.092,33 € 
191 1.420,37 € 397,70 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 267,43 € 93.490,03 € 93.757,46 € 
192 1.420,37 € 397,70 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 269,34 € 94.155,16 € 94.424,50 € 
193 1.420,37 € 397,70 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 271,24 € 94.822,20 € 95.093,45 € 
194 1.420,37 € 397,70 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 273,16 € 95.491,15 € 95.764,31 € 
195 1.434,57 € 401,68 € 1% 0,15% 0,42% 275,09 € 96.165,99 € 96.441,08 € 
196 1.434,57 € 401,68 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 277,02 € 96.842,76 € 97.119,78 € 
197 1.434,57 € 401,68 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 278,97 € 97.521,46 € 97.800,43 € 
198 1.434,57 € 401,68 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 280,91 € 98.202,11 € 98.483,02 € 
199 1.434,57 € 401,68 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 282,87 € 98.884,70 € 99.167,57 € 
200 1.434,57 € 401,68 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 284,82 € 99.569,25 € 99.854,07 € 
201 1.434,57 € 401,68 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 286,79 € 100.255,75 € 100.542,54 € 
202 1.434,57 € 401,68 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 288,76 € 100.944,22 € 101.232,98 € 
203 1.434,57 € 401,68 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 290,73 € 101.634,66 € 101.925,39 € 
204 1.434,57 € 401,68 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 292,71 € 102.327,07 € 102.619,78 € 
205 1.434,57 € 401,68 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 294,70 € 103.021,46 € 103.316,16 € 
206 1.434,57 € 401,68 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 296,69 € 103.717,84 € 104.014,53 € 
207 1.434,57 € 401,68 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 298,69 € 104.416,21 € 104.714,90 € 
208 1.448,92 € 405,70 € 1% 0,15% 0,42% 300,70 € 105.120,60 € 105.421,30 € 
209 1.448,92 € 405,70 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 302,72 € 105.827,00 € 106.129,72 € 
210 1.448,92 € 405,70 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 304,75 € 106.535,42 € 106.840,17 € 
211 1.448,92 € 405,70 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 306,78 € 107.245,87 € 107.552,65 € 
212 1.448,92 € 405,70 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 308,82 € 107.958,35 € 108.267,17 € 
213 1.448,92 € 405,70 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 310,87 € 108.672,87 € 108.983,73 € 
214 1.448,92 € 405,70 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 312,92 € 109.389,43 € 109.702,35 € 
215 1.448,92 € 405,70 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 314,97 € 110.108,04 € 110.423,01 € 
216 1.448,92 € 405,70 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 317,03 € 110.828,71 € 111.145,74 € 
217 1.448,92 € 405,70 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 319,10 € 111.551,44 € 111.870,54 € 
218 1.448,92 € 405,70 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 321,17 € 112.276,24 € 112.597,41 € 
219 1.448,92 € 405,70 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 323,25 € 113.003,11 € 113.326,36 € 
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220 1.448,92 € 405,70 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 325,34 € 113.732,05 € 114.057,39 € 
221 1.463,41 € 409,75 € 1% 0,15% 0,42% 327,44 € 114.467,15 € 114.794,59 € 
222 1.463,41 € 409,75 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 329,55 € 115.204,34 € 115.533,89 € 
223 1.463,41 € 409,75 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 331,66 € 115.943,64 € 116.275,31 € 
224 1.463,41 € 409,75 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 333,79 € 116.685,06 € 117.018,85 € 
225 1.463,41 € 409,75 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 335,91 € 117.428,60 € 117.764,51 € 
226 1.463,41 € 409,75 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 338,04 € 118.174,26 € 118.512,31 € 
227 1.463,41 € 409,75 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 340,18 € 118.922,06 € 119.262,25 € 
228 1.463,41 € 409,75 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 342,33 € 119.672,00 € 120.014,33 € 
229 1.463,41 € 409,75 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 344,48 € 120.424,08 € 120.768,56 € 
230 1.463,41 € 409,75 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 346,64 € 121.178,32 € 121.524,96 € 
231 1.463,41 € 409,75 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 348,80 € 121.934,71 € 122.283,51 € 
232 1.463,41 € 409,75 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 350,97 € 122.693,27 € 123.044,24 € 
233 1.463,41 € 409,75 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 353,15 € 123.453,99 € 123.807,14 € 
234 1.478,04 € 413,85 € 1% 0,15% 0,42% 355,34 € 124.220,99 € 124.576,33 € 
235 1.478,04 € 413,85 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 357,54 € 124.990,18 € 125.347,73 € 
236 1.478,04 € 413,85 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 359,75 € 125.761,58 € 126.121,33 € 
237 1.478,04 € 413,85 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 361,96 € 126.535,18 € 126.897,14 € 
238 1.478,04 € 413,85 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 364,18 € 127.310,99 € 127.675,17 € 
239 1.478,04 € 413,85 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 366,41 € 128.089,02 € 128.455,43 € 
240 1.478,04 € 413,85 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 368,64 € 128.869,28 € 129.237,92 € 
241 1.478,04 € 413,85 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 370,88 € 129.651,77 € 130.022,65 € 
242 1.478,04 € 413,85 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 373,12 € 130.436,50 € 130.809,62 € 
243 1.478,04 € 413,85 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 375,37 € 131.223,47 € 131.598,84 € 
244 1.478,04 € 413,85 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 377,63 € 132.012,69 € 132.390,33 € 
245 1.478,04 € 413,85 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 379,89 € 132.804,18 € 133.184,07 € 
246 1.478,04 € 413,85 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 382,17 € 133.597,92 € 133.980,09 € 
247 1.492,82 € 417,99 € 1% 0,15% 0,42% 384,45 € 134.398,08 € 134.782,53 € 
248 1.492,82 € 417,99 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 386,75 € 135.200,52 € 135.587,27 € 
249 1.492,82 € 417,99 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 389,05 € 136.005,26 € 136.394,31 € 
250 1.492,82 € 417,99 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 391,36 € 136.812,30 € 137.203,66 € 
251 1.492,82 € 417,99 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 393,68 € 137.621,65 € 138.015,33 € 
252 1.492,82 € 417,99 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 396,00 € 138.433,32 € 138.829,31 € 
253 1.492,82 € 417,99 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 398,33 € 139.247,30 € 139.645,63 € 
254 1.492,82 € 417,99 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 400,66 € 140.063,62 € 140.464,28 € 
255 1.492,82 € 417,99 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 403,00 € 140.882,27 € 141.285,27 € 
256 1.492,82 € 417,99 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 405,35 € 141.703,26 € 142.108,61 € 
257 1.492,82 € 417,99 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 407,71 € 142.526,60 € 142.934,31 € 
258 1.492,82 € 417,99 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 410,07 € 143.352,30 € 143.762,37 € 
259 1.492,82 € 417,99 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 412,44 € 144.180,36 € 144.592,79 € 
260 1.507,75 € 422,17 € 1% 0,15% 0,42% 414,82 € 145.014,96 € 145.429,79 € 
261 1.507,75 € 422,17 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 417,22 € 145.851,96 € 146.269,18 € 
262 1.507,75 € 422,17 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 419,62 € 146.691,34 € 147.110,96 € 
263 1.507,75 € 422,17 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 422,03 € 147.533,13 € 147.955,16 € 
264 1.507,75 € 422,17 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 424,44 € 148.377,33 € 148.801,77 € 
265 1.507,75 € 422,17 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 426,86 € 149.223,94 € 149.650,81 € 
266 1.507,75 € 422,17 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 429,29 € 150.072,98 € 150.502,27 € 
267 1.507,75 € 422,17 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 431,73 € 150.924,44 € 151.356,17 € 
268 1.507,75 € 422,17 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 434,17 € 151.778,34 € 152.212,51 € 
269 1.507,75 € 422,17 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 436,62 € 152.634,68 € 153.071,30 € 
270 1.507,75 € 422,17 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 439,08 € 153.493,47 € 153.932,55 € 
271 1.507,75 € 422,17 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 441,54 € 154.354,72 € 154.796,26 € 
272 1.507,75 € 422,17 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 444,01 € 155.218,43 € 155.662,44 € 
273 1.522,83 € 426,39 € 1% 0,15% 0,42% 446,50 € 156.088,83 € 156.535,33 € 
274 1.522,83 € 426,39 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 449,00 € 156.961,73 € 157.410,72 € 
275 1.522,83 € 426,39 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 451,50 € 157.837,12 € 158.288,62 € 
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276 1.522,83 € 426,39 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 454,01 € 158.715,01 € 159.169,02 € 
277 1.522,83 € 426,39 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 456,53 € 159.595,42 € 160.051,95 € 
278 1.522,83 € 426,39 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 459,06 € 160.478,34 € 160.937,40 € 
279 1.522,83 € 426,39 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 461,59 € 161.363,79 € 161.825,38 € 
280 1.522,83 € 426,39 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 464,13 € 162.251,77 € 162.715,90 € 
281 1.522,83 € 426,39 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 466,68 € 163.142,29 € 163.608,97 € 
282 1.522,83 € 426,39 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 469,23 € 164.035,36 € 164.504,60 € 
283 1.522,83 € 426,39 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 471,80 € 164.930,99 € 165.402,79 € 
284 1.522,83 € 426,39 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 474,36 € 165.829,18 € 166.303,54 € 
285 1.522,83 € 426,39 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 476,94 € 166.729,93 € 167.206,87 € 
286 1.538,05 € 430,66 € 1% 0,15% 0,42% 479,54 € 167.637,53 € 168.117,07 € 
287 1.538,05 € 430,66 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 482,14 € 168.547,72 € 169.029,86 € 
288 1.538,05 € 430,66 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 484,75 € 169.460,52 € 169.945,27 € 
289 1.538,05 € 430,66 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 487,37 € 170.375,93 € 170.863,30 € 
290 1.538,05 € 430,66 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 490,00 € 171.293,95 € 171.783,95 € 
291 1.538,05 € 430,66 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 492,63 € 172.214,60 € 172.707,24 € 
292 1.538,05 € 430,66 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 495,27 € 173.137,89 € 173.633,16 € 
293 1.538,05 € 430,66 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 497,92 € 174.063,82 € 174.561,74 € 
294 1.538,05 € 430,66 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 500,58 € 174.992,39 € 175.492,97 € 
295 1.538,05 € 430,66 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 503,24 € 175.923,63 € 176.426,87 € 
296 1.538,05 € 430,66 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 505,91 € 176.857,52 € 177.363,43 € 
297 1.538,05 € 430,66 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 508,59 € 177.794,09 € 178.302,68 € 
298 1.538,05 € 430,66 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 511,28 € 178.733,33 € 179.244,61 € 
299 1.553,43 € 434,96 € 1% 0,15% 0,42% 513,98 € 179.679,57 € 180.193,56 € 
300 1.553,43 € 434,96 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 516,70 € 180.628,52 € 181.145,22 € 
301 1.553,43 € 434,96 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 519,42 € 181.580,18 € 182.099,60 € 
302 1.553,43 € 434,96 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 522,15 € 182.534,57 € 183.056,72 € 
303 1.553,43 € 434,96 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 524,89 € 183.491,68 € 184.016,57 € 
304 1.553,43 € 434,96 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 527,64 € 184.451,53 € 184.979,17 € 
305 1.553,43 € 434,96 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 530,39 € 185.414,13 € 185.944,52 € 
306 1.553,43 € 434,96 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 533,15 € 186.379,48 € 186.912,63 € 
307 1.553,43 € 434,96 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 535,92 € 187.347,59 € 187.883,51 € 
308 1.553,43 € 434,96 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 538,70 € 188.318,47 € 188.857,17 € 
309 1.553,43 € 434,96 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 541,48 € 189.292,13 € 189.833,61 € 
310 1.553,43 € 434,96 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 544,28 € 190.268,57 € 190.812,85 € 
311 1.553,43 € 434,96 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 547,08 € 191.247,81 € 191.794,89 € 
312 1.568,97 € 439,31 € 1% 0,15% 0,42% 549,90 € 192.234,20 € 192.784,10 € 
313 1.568,97 € 439,31 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 552,73 € 193.223,41 € 193.776,14 € 
314 1.568,97 € 439,31 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 555,57 € 194.215,45 € 194.771,01 € 
315 1.568,97 € 439,31 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 558,41 € 195.210,32 € 195.768,74 € 
316 1.568,97 € 439,31 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 561,27 € 196.208,05 € 196.769,31 € 
317 1.568,97 € 439,31 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 564,13 € 197.208,62 € 197.772,75 € 
318 1.568,97 € 439,31 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 567,00 € 198.212,06 € 198.779,06 € 
319 1.568,97 € 439,31 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 569,88 € 199.218,37 € 199.788,25 € 
320 1.568,97 € 439,31 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 572,76 € 200.227,56 € 200.800,32 € 
321 1.568,97 € 439,31 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 575,66 € 201.239,63 € 201.815,29 € 
322 1.568,97 € 439,31 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 578,56 € 202.254,60 € 202.833,17 € 
323 1.568,97 € 439,31 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 581,47 € 203.272,48 € 203.853,95 € 
324 1.568,97 € 439,31 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 584,39 € 204.293,26 € 204.877,66 € 
325 1.584,66 € 443,70 € 1% 0,15% 0,42% 587,33 € 205.321,36 € 205.908,70 € 
326 1.584,66 € 443,70 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 590,28 € 206.352,40 € 206.942,68 € 
327 1.584,66 € 443,70 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 593,24 € 207.386,39 € 207.979,63 € 
328 1.584,66 € 443,70 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 596,21 € 208.423,34 € 209.019,54 € 
329 1.584,66 € 443,70 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 599,18 € 209.463,25 € 210.062,43 € 
330 1.584,66 € 443,70 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 602,17 € 210.506,14 € 211.108,30 € 
331 1.584,66 € 443,70 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 605,16 € 211.552,01 € 212.157,16 € 
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332 1.584,66 € 443,70 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 608,16 € 212.600,87 € 213.209,03 € 
333 1.584,66 € 443,70 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 611,17 € 213.652,73 € 214.263,90 € 
334 1.584,66 € 443,70 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 614,18 € 214.707,60 € 215.321,79 € 
335 1.584,66 € 443,70 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 617,21 € 215.765,49 € 216.382,70 € 
336 1.584,66 € 443,70 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 620,25 € 216.826,41 € 217.446,65 € 
337 1.584,66 € 443,70 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 623,29 € 217.890,36 € 218.513,65 € 
338 1.600,51 € 448,14 € 1% 0,15% 0,42% 626,35 € 218.961,79 € 219.588,14 € 
339 1.600,51 € 448,14 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 629,43 € 220.036,28 € 220.665,71 € 
340 1.600,51 € 448,14 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 632,51 € 221.113,85 € 221.746,36 € 
341 1.600,51 € 448,14 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 635,60 € 222.194,50 € 222.830,11 € 
342 1.600,51 € 448,14 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 638,70 € 223.278,25 € 223.916,95 € 
343 1.600,51 € 448,14 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 641,81 € 224.365,09 € 225.006,90 € 
344 1.600,51 € 448,14 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 644,93 € 225.455,04 € 226.099,97 € 
345 1.600,51 € 448,14 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 648,06 € 226.548,11 € 227.196,17 € 
346 1.600,51 € 448,14 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 651,19 € 227.644,31 € 228.295,50 € 
347 1.600,51 € 448,14 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 654,34 € 228.743,64 € 229.397,98 € 
348 1.600,51 € 448,14 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 657,49 € 229.846,12 € 230.503,61 € 
349 1.600,51 € 448,14 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 660,65 € 230.951,75 € 231.612,40 € 
350 1.600,51 € 448,14 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 663,82 € 232.060,54 € 232.724,37 € 
351 1.616,51 € 452,62 € 1% 0,15% 0,42% 667,02 € 233.176,99 € 233.844,01 € 
352 1.616,51 € 452,62 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 670,22 € 234.296,63 € 234.966,85 € 
353 1.616,51 € 452,62 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 673,43 € 235.419,47 € 236.092,91 € 
354 1.616,51 € 452,62 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 676,65 € 236.545,53 € 237.222,18 € 
355 1.616,51 € 452,62 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 679,88 € 237.674,80 € 238.354,69 € 
356 1.616,51 € 452,62 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 683,12 € 238.807,31 € 239.490,43 € 
357 1.616,51 € 452,62 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 686,37 € 239.943,06 € 240.629,43 € 
358 1.616,51 € 452,62 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 689,63 € 241.082,05 € 241.771,68 € 
359 1.616,51 € 452,62 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 692,90 € 242.224,31 € 242.917,20 € 
360 1.616,51 € 452,62 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 696,17 € 243.369,83 € 244.066,00 € 
361 1.616,51 € 452,62 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 699,46 € 244.518,62 € 245.218,09 € 
362 1.616,51 € 452,62 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 702,76 € 245.670,71 € 246.373,47 € 
363 1.616,51 € 452,62 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 706,06 € 246.826,09 € 247.532,15 € 
364 1.632,68 € 457,15 € 1% 0,15% 0,42% 709,39 € 247.989,30 € 248.698,69 € 
365 1.632,68 € 457,15 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 712,73 € 249.155,84 € 249.868,56 € 
366 1.632,68 € 457,15 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 716,07 € 250.325,71 € 251.041,78 € 
367 1.632,68 € 457,15 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 719,43 € 251.498,93 € 252.218,36 € 
368 1.632,68 € 457,15 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 722,79 € 252.675,51 € 253.398,31 € 
369 1.632,68 € 457,15 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 726,17 € 253.855,45 € 254.581,62 € 
370 1.632,68 € 457,15 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 729,55 € 255.038,77 € 255.768,33 € 
371 1.632,68 € 457,15 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 732,95 € 256.225,48 € 256.958,43 € 
372 1.632,68 € 457,15 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 736,35 € 257.415,58 € 258.151,93 € 
373 1.632,68 € 457,15 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 739,77 € 258.609,08 € 259.348,85 € 
374 1.632,68 € 457,15 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 743,19 € 259.806,00 € 260.549,19 € 
375 1.632,68 € 457,15 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 746,63 € 261.006,34 € 261.752,96 € 
376 1.632,68 € 457,15 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 750,07 € 262.210,11 € 262.960,18 € 
377 1.649,00 € 461,72 € 1% 0,15% 0,42% 753,54 € 263.421,90 € 264.175,43 € 
378 1.649,00 € 461,72 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 757,01 € 264.637,15 € 265.394,17 € 
379 1.649,00 € 461,72 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 760,50 € 265.855,89 € 266.616,38 € 
380 1.649,00 € 461,72 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 763,99 € 267.078,11 € 267.842,10 € 
381 1.649,00 € 461,72 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 767,50 € 268.303,82 € 269.071,32 € 
382 1.649,00 € 461,72 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 771,02 € 269.533,04 € 270.304,06 € 
383 1.649,00 € 461,72 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 774,54 € 270.765,78 € 271.540,32 € 
384 1.649,00 € 461,72 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 778,08 € 272.002,04 € 272.780,12 € 
385 1.649,00 € 461,72 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 781,63 € 273.241,84 € 274.023,47 € 
386 1.649,00 € 461,72 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 785,18 € 274.485,19 € 275.270,37 € 
387 1.649,00 € 461,72 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 788,75 € 275.732,09 € 276.520,84 € 
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388 1.649,00 € 461,72 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 792,33 € 276.982,56 € 277.774,89 € 
389 1.649,00 € 461,72 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 795,91 € 278.236,61 € 279.032,52 € 
390 1.665,49 € 466,34 € 1% 0,15% 0,42% 799,52 € 279.498,86 € 280.298,38 € 
391 1.665,49 € 466,34 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 803,15 € 280.764,72 € 281.567,86 € 
392 1.665,49 € 466,34 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 806,78 € 282.034,20 € 282.840,98 € 
393 1.665,49 € 466,34 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 810,42 € 283.307,32 € 284.117,74 € 
394 1.665,49 € 466,34 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 814,07 € 284.584,07 € 285.398,14 € 
395 1.665,49 € 466,34 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 817,73 € 285.864,48 € 286.682,21 € 
396 1.665,49 € 466,34 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 821,41 € 287.148,55 € 287.969,96 € 
397 1.665,49 € 466,34 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 825,09 € 288.436,30 € 289.261,39 € 
398 1.665,49 € 466,34 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 828,78 € 289.727,73 € 290.556,51 € 
399 1.665,49 € 466,34 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 832,49 € 291.022,85 € 291.855,34 € 
400 1.665,49 € 466,34 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 836,20 € 292.321,67 € 293.157,88 € 
401 1.665,49 € 466,34 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 839,93 € 293.624,22 € 294.464,15 € 
402 1.665,49 € 466,34 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 843,67 € 294.930,49 € 295.774,15 € 
403 1.682,15 € 471,00 € 1% 0,15% 0,42% 847,43 € 296.245,15 € 297.092,58 € 
404 1.682,15 € 471,00 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 851,20 € 297.563,58 € 298.414,78 € 
405 1.682,15 € 471,00 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 854,98 € 298.885,78 € 299.740,77 € 
406 1.682,15 € 471,00 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 858,77 € 300.211,77 € 301.070,54 € 
407 1.682,15 € 471,00 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 862,58 € 301.541,54 € 302.404,12 € 
408 1.682,15 € 471,00 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 866,39 € 302.875,12 € 303.741,52 € 
409 1.682,15 € 471,00 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 870,22 € 304.212,52 € 305.082,74 € 
410 1.682,15 € 471,00 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 874,06 € 305.553,74 € 306.427,79 € 
411 1.682,15 € 471,00 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 877,90 € 306.898,79 € 307.776,70 € 
412 1.682,15 € 471,00 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 881,76 € 308.247,70 € 309.129,46 € 
413 1.682,15 € 471,00 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 885,63 € 309.600,46 € 310.486,09 € 
414 1.682,15 € 471,00 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 889,51 € 310.957,10 € 311.846,61 € 
415 1.682,15 € 471,00 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 893,40 € 312.317,61 € 313.211,01 € 
416 1.698,97 € 475,71 € 1% 0,15% 0,42% 897,32 € 313.686,72 € 314.584,05 € 
417 1.698,97 € 475,71 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 901,25 € 315.059,76 € 315.961,01 € 
418 1.698,97 € 475,71 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 905,19 € 316.436,72 € 317.341,90 € 
419 1.698,97 € 475,71 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 909,14 € 317.817,61 € 318.726,75 € 
420 1.698,97 € 475,71 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 913,10 € 319.202,46 € 320.115,56 € 
421 1.698,97 € 475,71 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 917,07 € 320.591,27 € 321.508,35 € 
422 1.698,97 € 475,71 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 921,06 € 321.984,06 € 322.905,11 € 
423 1.698,97 € 475,71 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 925,05 € 323.380,82 € 324.305,87 € 
424 1.698,97 € 475,71 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 929,06 € 324.781,59 € 325.710,64 € 
425 1.698,97 € 475,71 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 933,08 € 326.186,36 € 327.119,43 € 
426 1.698,97 € 475,71 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 937,11 € 327.595,14 € 328.532,25 € 
427 1.698,97 € 475,71 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 941,15 € 329.007,96 € 329.949,11 € 
428 1.698,97 € 475,71 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 945,20 € 330.424,82 € 331.370,02 € 
429 1.715,96 € 480,47 € 1% 0,15% 0,42% 949,28 € 331.850,49 € 332.799,77 € 
430 1.715,96 € 480,47 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 953,37 € 333.280,24 € 334.233,61 € 
431 1.715,96 € 480,47 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 957,47 € 334.714,08 € 335.671,55 € 
432 1.715,96 € 480,47 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 961,58 € 336.152,01 € 337.113,60 € 
433 1.715,96 € 480,47 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 965,71 € 337.594,07 € 338.559,78 € 
434 1.715,96 € 480,47 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 969,85 € 339.040,24 € 340.010,09 € 
435 1.715,96 € 480,47 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 973,99 € 340.490,56 € 341.464,55 € 
436 1.715,96 € 480,47 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 978,16 € 341.945,02 € 342.923,18 € 
437 1.715,96 € 480,47 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 982,33 € 343.403,65 € 344.385,97 € 
438 1.715,96 € 480,47 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 986,51 € 344.866,44 € 345.852,95 € 
439 1.715,96 € 480,47 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 990,71 € 346.333,42 € 347.324,13 € 
440 1.715,96 € 480,47 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 994,92 € 347.804,60 € 348.799,52 € 
441 1.715,96 € 480,47 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 999,14 € 349.279,99 € 350.279,12 € 
442 1.733,12 € 485,27 € 1% 0,15% 0,42% 1.003,38 € 350.764,40 € 351.767,78 € 
443 1.733,12 € 485,27 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.007,64 € 352.253,05 € 353.260,69 € 
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444 1.733,12 € 485,27 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.011,91 € 353.745,97 € 354.757,88 € 
445 1.733,12 € 485,27 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.016,20 € 355.243,15 € 356.259,35 € 
446 1.733,12 € 485,27 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.020,49 € 356.744,62 € 357.765,11 € 
447 1.733,12 € 485,27 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.024,80 € 358.250,39 € 359.275,18 € 
448 1.733,12 € 485,27 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.029,12 € 359.760,46 € 360.789,57 € 
449 1.733,12 € 485,27 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.033,45 € 361.274,85 € 362.308,30 € 
450 1.733,12 € 485,27 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.037,79 € 362.793,57 € 363.831,36 € 
451 1.733,12 € 485,27 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.042,15 € 364.316,64 € 365.358,79 € 
452 1.733,12 € 485,27 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.046,52 € 365.844,06 € 366.890,58 € 
453 1.733,12 € 485,27 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.050,90 € 367.375,85 € 368.426,76 € 
454 1.733,12 € 485,27 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.055,30 € 368.912,03 € 369.967,32 € 
455 1.750,45 € 490,13 € 1% 0,15% 0,42% 1.059,72 € 370.457,45 € 371.517,17 € 
456 1.750,45 € 490,13 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.064,15 € 372.007,29 € 373.071,44 € 
457 1.750,45 € 490,13 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.068,60 € 373.561,57 € 374.630,17 € 
458 1.750,45 € 490,13 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.073,06 € 375.120,29 € 376.193,35 € 
459 1.750,45 € 490,13 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.077,53 € 376.683,47 € 377.761,00 € 
460 1.750,45 € 490,13 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.082,01 € 378.251,13 € 379.333,14 € 
461 1.750,45 € 490,13 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.086,51 € 379.823,26 € 380.909,77 € 
462 1.750,45 € 490,13 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.091,02 € 381.399,90 € 382.490,92 € 
463 1.750,45 € 490,13 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.095,54 € 382.981,04 € 384.076,58 € 
464 1.750,45 € 490,13 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.100,08 € 384.566,71 € 385.666,79 € 
465 1.750,45 € 490,13 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.104,63 € 386.156,91 € 387.261,54 € 
466 1.750,45 € 490,13 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.109,19 € 387.751,66 € 388.860,85 € 
467 1.750,45 € 490,13 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.113,76 € 389.350,98 € 390.464,74 € 
468 1.767,95 € 495,03 € 1% 0,15% 0,42% 1.118,37 € 390.959,77 € 392.078,13 € 
469 1.767,95 € 495,03 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.122,98 € 392.573,16 € 393.696,14 € 
470 1.767,95 € 495,03 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.127,61 € 394.191,17 € 395.318,78 € 
471 1.767,95 € 495,03 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.132,25 € 395.813,80 € 396.946,05 € 
472 1.767,95 € 495,03 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.136,91 € 397.441,08 € 398.577,99 € 
473 1.767,95 € 495,03 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.141,57 € 399.073,01 € 400.214,59 € 
474 1.767,95 € 495,03 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.146,26 € 400.709,61 € 401.855,87 € 
475 1.767,95 € 495,03 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.150,95 € 402.350,90 € 403.501,85 € 
476 1.767,95 € 495,03 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.155,66 € 403.996,87 € 405.152,53 € 
477 1.767,95 € 495,03 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.160,38 € 405.647,56 € 406.807,94 € 
478 1.767,95 € 495,03 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.165,12 € 407.302,97 € 408.468,08 € 
479 1.767,95 € 495,03 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.169,86 € 408.963,11 € 410.132,97 € 
480 1.767,95 € 495,03 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.174,63 € 410.628,00 € 411.802,63 € 
481 1.785,63 € 499,98 € 1% 0,15% 0,42% 1.179,42 € 412.302,61 € 413.482,02 € 
482 1.785,63 € 499,98 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.184,22 € 413.982,00 € 415.166,22 € 
483 1.785,63 € 499,98 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.189,04 € 415.666,20 € 416.855,24 € 
484 1.785,63 € 499,98 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.193,87 € 417.355,22 € 418.549,09 € 
485 1.785,63 € 499,98 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.198,72 € 419.049,07 € 420.247,78 € 
486 1.785,63 € 499,98 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.203,58 € 420.747,76 € 421.951,33 € 
487 1.785,63 € 499,98 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.208,45 € 422.451,31 € 423.659,76 € 
488 1.785,63 € 499,98 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.213,34 € 424.159,74 € 425.373,07 € 
489 1.785,63 € 499,98 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.218,24 € 425.873,05 € 427.091,29 € 
490 1.785,63 € 499,98 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.223,15 € 427.591,26 € 428.814,42 € 
491 1.785,63 € 499,98 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.228,08 € 429.314,39 € 430.542,48 € 
492 1.785,63 € 499,98 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.233,02 € 431.042,45 € 432.275,48 € 
493 1.785,63 € 499,98 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.237,98 € 432.775,45 € 434.013,44 € 
494 1.803,49 € 504,98 € 1% 0,15% 0,42% 1.242,97 € 434.518,41 € 435.761,38 € 
495 1.803,49 € 504,98 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.247,97 € 436.266,36 € 437.514,32 € 
496 1.803,49 € 504,98 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.252,98 € 438.019,30 € 439.272,28 € 
497 1.803,49 € 504,98 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.258,01 € 439.777,26 € 441.035,27 € 
498 1.803,49 € 504,98 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.263,05 € 441.540,25 € 442.803,30 € 
499 1.803,49 € 504,98 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.268,11 € 443.308,28 € 444.576,39 € 
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500 1.803,49 € 504,98 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.273,18 € 445.081,37 € 446.354,55 € 
501 1.803,49 € 504,98 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.278,27 € 446.859,53 € 448.137,80 € 
502 1.803,49 € 504,98 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.283,37 € 448.642,78 € 449.926,15 € 
503 1.803,49 € 504,98 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.288,49 € 450.431,12 € 451.719,61 € 
504 1.803,49 € 504,98 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.293,62 € 452.224,59 € 453.518,20 € 
505 1.803,49 € 504,98 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.298,76 € 454.023,18 € 455.321,94 € 
506 1.803,49 € 504,98 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.303,92 € 455.826,92 € 457.130,84 € 
507 1.821,52 € 510,03 € 1% 0,15% 0,42% 1.309,11 € 457.640,87 € 458.949,98 € 
508 1.821,52 € 510,03 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.314,31 € 459.460,01 € 460.774,32 € 
509 1.821,52 € 510,03 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.319,53 € 461.284,35 € 462.603,88 € 
510 1.821,52 € 510,03 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.324,77 € 463.113,91 € 464.438,67 € 
511 1.821,52 € 510,03 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.330,02 € 464.948,70 € 466.278,72 € 
512 1.821,52 € 510,03 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.335,28 € 466.788,74 € 468.124,02 € 
513 1.821,52 € 510,03 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.340,56 € 468.634,05 € 469.974,61 € 
514 1.821,52 € 510,03 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.345,85 € 470.484,63 € 471.830,48 € 
515 1.821,52 € 510,03 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.351,16 € 472.340,51 € 473.691,67 € 
516 1.821,52 € 510,03 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.356,48 € 474.201,70 € 475.558,18 € 
517 1.821,52 € 510,03 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.361,82 € 476.068,21 € 477.430,03 € 
518 1.821,52 € 510,03 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.367,18 € 477.940,06 € 479.307,24 € 
519 1.821,52 € 510,03 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.372,55 € 479.817,26 € 481.189,81 € 
520 1.839,74 € 515,13 € 1% 0,15% 0,42% 1.377,95 € 481.704,94 € 483.082,89 € 
521 1.839,74 € 515,13 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.383,36 € 483.598,01 € 484.981,38 € 
522 1.839,74 € 515,13 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.388,79 € 485.496,50 € 486.885,30 € 
523 1.839,74 € 515,13 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.394,24 € 487.400,42 € 488.794,66 € 
524 1.839,74 € 515,13 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.399,70 € 489.309,79 € 490.709,49 € 
525 1.839,74 € 515,13 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.405,18 € 491.224,62 € 492.629,80 € 
526 1.839,74 € 515,13 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.410,67 € 493.144,93 € 494.555,60 € 
527 1.839,74 € 515,13 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.416,18 € 495.070,72 € 496.486,91 € 
528 1.839,74 € 515,13 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.421,71 € 497.002,03 € 498.423,74 € 
529 1.839,74 € 515,13 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.427,25 € 498.938,87 € 500.366,11 € 
530 1.839,74 € 515,13 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.432,80 € 500.881,24 € 502.314,04 € 
531 1.839,74 € 515,13 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.438,37 € 502.829,17 € 504.267,54 € 
532 1.839,74 € 515,13 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.443,96 € 504.782,67 € 506.226,63 € 
533 1.858,14 € 520,28 € 1% 0,15% 0,42% 1.449,58 € 506.746,91 € 508.196,49 € 
534 1.858,14 € 520,28 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.455,22 € 508.716,77 € 510.171,99 € 
535 1.858,14 € 520,28 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.460,87 € 510.692,27 € 512.153,13 € 
536 1.858,14 € 520,28 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.466,53 € 512.673,41 € 514.139,95 € 
537 1.858,14 € 520,28 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.472,22 € 514.660,23 € 516.132,44 € 
538 1.858,14 € 520,28 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.477,92 € 516.652,72 € 518.130,64 € 
539 1.858,14 € 520,28 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.483,63 € 518.650,92 € 520.134,55 € 
540 1.858,14 € 520,28 € 0% 0,15% 0,42% 1.489,37 € 520.654,83 € 522.144,20 € 
 
  
Where BMR stands for Bond Market Return and SMR stands for Stock Market Return, 
the following formula was usd to calculate the postecipated rent: 
1) Monthly Pension =
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙∗𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
1+(𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)^(−𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠)
(1+𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)
 
Period Initial Salary 
Initial 
Contr Monthly Return Total Capital Final Pension Last Salary 
45 years  1.235,67 € 345,99 € 0,29% 522.144,20 € 3.001,61 € 1.858,14 € 
40 years  1.235,67 € 345,99 € 0,29% 411.802,63 € 2.367,30 € 1.767,95 € 
35 years  1.235,67 € 345,99 € 0,29% 320.115,56 € 1.840,22 € 1.698,97 € 
30 years  1.235,67 € 345,99 € 0,29% 244.066,00 € 1.403,04 € 1.616,51 € 
25 years  1.235,67 € 345,99 € 0,29% 181.145,22 € 1.041,33 € 1.616,51 € 
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